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Abstract
Techniques for determining and applying cyber security decisions typically follow risk-
based analytical approaches where alternative options are put forward based on goals
and context, and weighed in accordance to risk severity metrics. These decision making
approaches are however difficult to apply in risk situations bounded by uncertainty as
decision alternatives are either unknown or unclear. This problem is further compounded
by the rarity of expert security decision makers and the far-reaching repercussions of un-
informed decision making.
The nature of operations in cyber security indicates that only a handful of systems are
independent of the human operators, exposing the majority of organisations to risk from
security threats and risks as a product of human decision making limitations. Addressing
the problem requires considering factors contributing to risk and uncertainty during the
early stages of system design, motivating the development of systems that are not only
usable and secure, but that facilitate informed decision making as a central goal.
The thesis investigates this by posing the question; what system design techniques
should be taken into consideration to facilitate cyber security decision making during situ-
ations of risk and uncertainty? The research was approached qualitatively with interviews
as the main data elicitation approach. Grounded Theory was applied to five security de-
cision making studies to inductively elicit, model, and validate design requirements for
Risk-based Decision Making in cyber security.
Contributions arising from thesis work are: an identification of factors contributing to se-
curity analysts’ risk practices and understanding, a model for communicating and tracing
risk rationalisation by cyber security decision makers, a conceptual model illustrating the
various concepts in cyber security decision making and their relationship, and guidelines
and suggested implementation techniques guiding the specification of requirements for
systems deployed in cyber security Risk-based Decision Making. The thesis is validated
by applying the proposed design guidelines to inform an approach used to design a char-
ity’s secure data handling policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis motivation
While the ever increasing number of security breaches in organisations can hint at a
lack of security analysts’ technical know knowledge, a growing attack surface and threat
landscape (TalkTalk 2015, Mossack Fonseca 2016, Equifax 2017, Quora 2018), recent
attacks cast doubt on the nature of decision making during security operations; raising
the question - what factors do organisations consider when addressing risk and uncertain
conditions?
To illustrate, compare the difference between Uber and Clarkson’s (a shipping company)
responses to ransom requests after the two companies were breached. Uber paid the at-
tackers $100,000.00 to delete the stolen data but was later fined $148,000,000.00 by the
Information Commissioner for breaching regulations (Lee 2018), while Clarkson refused
to be held to ransom and made the news of the attack public. There is so far no adverse
information on Clarkson’s course of action (Davies 2017).
Security analysts are experts who review system environments by collecting and analysing
data to provide insight into implementing and improving security. To maintain security, an-
alysts use a variety of tools to facilitate decision making typically approached through the
use of risk management standards and procedures (Fenz et al. 2014). The analysts’ role
is crucial in areas where automation cannot be applied fully or human intervention is nec-
essary (human in the loop). While human intervention is of paramount importance, it is
the mutual human-computer relationship that elevates awareness and facilitates decision
making.
The systems-security relationship has generally been identified to have three user groups
(Smetters and Grinter 2002). These are, the developers who implement security require-
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ments at design, the security analysts who oversee the systems security infrastructure by
enforcing and maintaining security rules, and the end users who (presumably) abide by
the security rules. Despite the identification of the three user groups, there is a paucity of
research focussing on design to facilitate the security experts’ decision making (Flechais
and Sasse 2009, Green and Smith 2016), and more so, from a Cognitive Systems Engi-
neering perspective (Wilson et al. 2013).
Unlike traditional User-centered design approaches, Cognitive Systems Engineering con-
siders cognitive requirements and the context within which decisions occur. Cognition re-
lates to how people think and what they know, how they organise and structure informa-
tion, and what they seek to understand better (Crandall et al. 2006, p. 3). Cognitive Sys-
tems Engineering focusses on the early stages of design, which implies addressing the
rationale (why) behind the selection of certain design options, differing from later stages of
design that address the “how” of design (Yu 2011). By focussing on the early stages, Cog-
nitive Systems Engineering takes wider cognitive complexities in socio-technical systems
into account, as opposed to the narrower user interaction view adopted by later-stage
approaches focusing on Human Computer Interaction (HCI) design features (Roedl and
Stolterman 2013).
Designing for Risk-based Decision Making (RBDM) means considering various forms of
risk and uncertainty and providing reasonable assurance that design requirements for
informed decision making are in place. Recent work on usable security (Faily 2018) has
demonstrated how security and usability requirements may harmoniously be integrated
during the early stages of design. Drawing inspiration from this, the aim of this research
was identifying how RBDM may be facilitated during the early design stages. Require-
ments were elicited by investigating the decision making activities of security analysts.
Considering risk and uncertainty during the early stages of design has long been ap-
preciated in industries with low error acceptance rates such as the safety-critical sector
(Johnson et al. 2013, Lin et al. 2015). Here, they aim to address risk as early as possible
with systems designed towards reducing error rates and attaining quick user response
times (Fisher and Kingma 2001). It may be argued that the error threshold is relatively
higher in non-safety-critical settings and that the response time is not as vital. However,
this becomes trivial given the low-risk threshold prevalent in security, where it only re-
quires one weak link to exploit an entire system (Sasse et al. 2001). Given the case, a
call for approaches facilitating design for Risk-based Decision Making in cyber security is
warranted.
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1.2 Research question
What system design techniques should be taken into consideration to facilitate cyber se-
curity decision making during situations of risk and uncertainty?
The research question is broken into the following, aimed at addressing three main re-
search areas illustrated in Figure 1.1.
• Aim 1: Identify factors influencing risk analysis practices deployed by cyber security
risk-based decision makers.
• Aim 2: Propose approaches for adapting cyber security decision making tech-
niques to design.
• Aim 3: Propose approaches supporting the specification of design requirements
for systems facilitating cyber security Risk-based Decision Making.
Figure 1.1: Research areas
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1.3 Contributions
The principal claim of this thesis is the presentation of complementary elements sup-
porting the specification of design requirements for systems deployed in cyber security
RBDM. The contributions consists of:
• An identification of factors contributing to security analysts’ risk practices and un-
derstanding.
• A normative model for communicating and tracing risk rationalisation by cyber se-
curity decision makers.
• A conceptual model illustrating the various concepts in cyber security decision mak-
ing and their relationship.
• Guidelines and suggested implementation techniques guiding the specification of
requirements for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM.
Based on our research dissemination activities (see Section 1.5), the assumption has
sometimes been that the research is addressing RBDM in design as opposed to design
for RBDM. While the two have similar research areas (see Figure 1.1), RBDM in design
aims at investigating approaches for reducing risk in design; problems are from the design
domain and solutions are for decision making (risk analysis approaches). Contrarily,
design for RBDM aims at investigating approaches for reducing risk in decision making
during system operations; problems are from the decision making domain and solutions
are for design (design recommendations).
1.4 Organisation of the dissertation
The dissertation overview is illustrated in Figure 1.2 and detailed below.
Chapter 2 presents a literature survey covering the state-of-the-art in the three main
research areas. Concepts from risk and its relation to security are reviewed before re-
viewing relevant concepts from decision-making focussed on human cognition. Next,
approaches from User-Centered design are reviewed and the chapter concludes with re-
flections.
Chapter 3 describes the research approach supporting the thesis from a philosophical
and methodological perspective. It presents the rationale behind the adoption of the re-
search approach by considering identified gaps between decision making and design
research.
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To address the research gap in Chapter 2, empirical research is carried out in Chapter
4 to understand risk analysis practices deployed by cyber security risk-based decision-
makers. The chapter reports on decision making from two risk analysis studies; first
proactive and then reactive.
Chapter 5 builds on research in chapters 2 and 4, and is the first of two chapters aiming
at adapting cyber security decision making techniques to design. The chapter presents a
normative model for communicating and tracing the rationalisation of risk by cyber secu-
rity decision-makers. The chapter discusses the model’s design, before concluding with
two validation studies.
Chapter 6 builds on findings from Chapter 5 and is the second aiming at adapting cyber
security decision making techniques to design. It presents a conceptual model for design-
ing for RBDM, illustrating the various concepts in cyber security decision making and their
relationship. First, an integrated model is presented, before detailing and justifying the
concepts in related sub-models using adaptations of events surrounding a Distributed-
Denial-of-Service attack on a real organisation.
Chapter 7 instantiates the conceptual model presented in Chapter 6 by presenting de-
sign guidelines and suggested implementation techniques guiding the specification of
requirements for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM. The chapter first presents
the rationale behind guideline selection before detailing the guidelines.
Chapter 8 presents a case study used to validate the guidelines presented in Chapter
7 as a cumulation of work presented in this dissertation. This chapter reports on how
the guidelines were used to inform an approach used to design a charity’s secure data
handling policy.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by providing key research findings. It evaluates
how the overall research question was satisfied, provides suggestions for future work,
and closes by re-emphasizing the relevance and value of the research contribution.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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1.5 Publications arising form thesis work
This section presents material in Chapters 4 to 6 that have been published in peer-
reviewed journals, conference proceedings and workshops.
• M’manga, A., Faily, S., McAlaney, J., and Williams, C. 2017. Folk Risk Analysis:
Factors Influencing Security Analysts’ Interpretation of Risk. In Proceedings of the
13th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). Online proceedings.
*Contributing to Chapter 4
• M’manga, A., Faily, S., McAlaney, J., Williams, C., Kadobayashi, Y., and Miyamoto,
D. 2018. Qualitative Adaptation: Informing Design for Risk-based Decision Mak-
ing. In Proceedings of the 32nd International BCS Human Computer Interaction
Conference. Online proceedings. *Contributing to Chapter 4
• M’manga, A., Faily, S., McAlaney, J., Williams, C. 2018. Rationalising Decision
Making about Risk: A Normative Approach. In Proceedings of the 12th International
Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & Assurance (HAISA), pp.
263-271. *Contributing to Chapter 5
• M’manga, A., Faily, S., McAlaney, J., Williams, C., Kadobayashi, Y., and Miyamoto,
D. 2019. A Normative Decision Making Model for Cyber Security. Journal of Infor-
mation and Computer Security. In press. *Contributing to Chapter 5
• M’manga, A., Faily, S., McAlaney, J., and Williams, C. 2017. System Design Consid-
erations for Risk Perception. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Confer-
ence on Research Challenges in Information Science, pp. 322-327. *Contributing
to Chapter 6
1.6 Chapter summary
This chapter introduced the research upon which the thesis is founded. This included
the research motivation and the research question and related aims. The chapter pre-
sented an overview of the research themes, identified the main research contributions
and elaborated what the thesis addresses. In summary, The dissertation investigates
how to effectively embed RBDM within cyber security system design.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Outline
In this chapter reviews the state-of-the-art in three research areas contributing to design-
ing for RBDM in cyber security, namely risk and security, decision making, and User-
Centered design.
The justifications for selecting the three areas are; to design for cyber security risk-based
decision-makers, the nature of activities and the risks the decision-makers address must
first be understood. This required a review of the fundamental meaning of risk in general,
and risk as it relates to cyber security. Because the research aims to provide design
recommendations for systems facilitating human decision making, work that investigates
cognition and decision making is then reviewed to understand how it may be used to
facilitate design. While, it is appreciated that social factors such as team collaboration
(Champion et al. 2012, Buchan and Taylor 2016) or Groupthink (Turner and Pratkanis
1998) play a role in decision making, the research scope focusses on the individual
decision-makers, however, investigations shall be made on how the findings translate
to team/group decision making in future work. Next, the body of work on systems design
under the User-Centered design philosophy is reviewed with the aim of identifying best
practice for eliciting and specifying design requirements. In conclusion, a brief review on
the relationship between automation and decision making is presented.
The identification of literature was based on keyword (and combinations) searches in
academic databases and search engines. These include ACM Digital Library, IEEE
Explore, ScienceDirect and Scopus for computing publications, and PsycINFO, Psyc-
BOOKS, PsycARTICLES, and APA PsycNET for psychology related publications. Snow-
balling from one publication to another was also used where necessary. Due to the
interdisciplinary nature of the research, keywords used were sometimes specific to a dis-
8
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 9
Sample Keyword Search
Risk
Risk analysis
Risk perception
Risk-based decision making
Situation awareness
Contextual awareness
Uncertainty
Decision making
Naturalistic decision making
Security analyst activities
Security information workers
Decision automation
Design for security
Design for decision
Human cognition
User centered design
Table 2.1: Sample literature survey keywords
cipline. Where non-specific keywords were used, searches were repeated in different
disciplinary databases due to difference in application and translation of terms. For ex-
ample, a search for the keywords “risk decision making” in Computing databases gener-
ally returned publications on the application of risk approaches in decision making, while
psychology databases returned results on understanding the root cause for a decision in
risky situations. Table 2.1 provides sample keywords used in the literature survey.
Contributions from this chapter are in the presentation of the state-of-the-art and the iden-
tification of limitations in the research areas in facilitating design for cyber security RBDM
- upon which the thesis is motivated.
2.2 Risk
This section aims to bring out an understanding of risk decision making in cyber security.
To do this, the first goal is to gain an understanding of the fundamental meaning of risk
and uncertainty; from which, RBDM is derived, and the second goal is to investigate
RBDM in relation to the security analysts.
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2.2.1 Risk and uncertainty
The meaning of risk has been the bone of contention for many years (Adams 2012, Fis-
chhoff et al. 1984). Originally risk was viewed as the probability of something adverse
happening (Royal Society 1983, Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011). This view presented the
notion of unwanted outcomes to uncertainty. In recent years, the meaning has changed
to include positive future outcomes to uncertainty, thus promoting neutral sounding risk
definitions like “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO 2009).
Risk is divided into objective and perceived risk (Royal Society 1983). Objective risk
refers to the scientific understanding of risk that is capable of measurement such as in-
surance and public health. Perceived risk relates to the subjective assumptions people
hold (Fagan and Khan 2016). Perceived risk is characterised by ideologies and beliefs
such as the assumption that risk is low when benefit is high, and high when benefit is low.
In the 1738 study, later known as the Expected Utility theory (Bernoulli 1954), Bernoulli
observed that objective and perceived risk are actually complementary and not mutually
exclusive. He stated that although people may be faced with the same uncertainties, the
willingness to take risks is based on the rational judgement on individual circumstances
and not just the perceived gain.
More recently, the Prospects theory has taken this further by suggesting that risk deci-
sion making is sometimes not a rational process, but that decisions are made based on a
reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Kahneman 2003). For example, a person
who has won one bet may bet again in the belief they are likely to win again, even though
the second bet is completely independent (in probability terms) from the first.
Bernoulli and Kahneman’s theories exemplify the difference between normative and de-
scriptive approaches to decision making (see Section 2.3.1), where the first tries to iden-
tify optimal choice while the latter scrutinises real-life choices. However, the two theories
do not fully consider uncertainty as they are posited on the premise that probabilistic al-
ternatives are known before decisions are made.
Uncertainty is a view held regardless of the nature of the risk (wanted, unwanted, ob-
jective and perceived). Adams (1995) differentiates the meaning of risk and uncertainty
by stating that risk is when the odds are known, but the actual outcomes are unknown
(known probability of outcome). For example, there is a chance that system security
will be compromised, how that might happen is unknown but we can identify probable
vectors of compromise. Uncertainty is when both odds and outcomes are unknown (un-
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known probability of outcome). For example, when might the compromise happen and
what might the impact be? The idea that risk and uncertainty as separate factors may
be traced back to Frank Knight’s 1921 publication on economics (Knight 2009) where he
argued that risk is a value susceptible to measurement, while uncertainty is not.
Like risk, uncertainty has also been divided into subcategories, the two most common be-
ing aleatoric; resulting from randomness, and epistemic; resulting from a limited data of
knowledge. From a statistical perspective, the two are essential in calculating probability,
however, the dissertation’s interest lies in the understanding that epistemic uncertainty is
subjective and varies from person to person, while aleatoric is not (O’Hagan 2004).
2.2.2 Risk-based Decision Making
The body of work in security fails to present a substantial definition for the term “Risk-
based Decision Making”. This may be attributed to the fact that security is synonymous
with risk and the literature narrative has focussed on decision making in security, where
risk is implied, or the literature has focussed on risk, where decision making is implied.
This differs from the safety-critical literature, where the focus is on safety and not secu-
rity. Here RBDM is used to describe a process where a set of alternatives are considered
during risk response to arrive at optimal choice (Lin et al. 2015, Macesker et al. 2002).
Though a consensus on the definition of RBDM does not seem available, the one posed
by the U.S coast guards appears widely accepted. They define RBDM as “the process
that organises information about the possibility for one or more unwanted outcomes to
occur into a broad, orderly structure that helps decision makers make more informed
management choices” (Macesker et al. 2002).
An alternative to the use of RBDM, has been to substitute it for the term risk-informed de-
cision making (RIDM) Ersdal and Aven (2008). Here too, the literature lacks a consensus
as to whether RBDM and RIDM are indeed interchangeable terms. The opposing school
of thought view RBDM processes as limited to technical analysis that do not consider
wider contextual factors and deliberation (Stamatelatos et al. 2006, Dezfuli et al. 2010).
Following these lines, RIDM has been defined as “a deliberative process that uses a set
of performance measures, together with other considerations, to inform decision-making”
(Dezfuli et al. 2010)
Based on this analysis, both the definitions presented above are deemed unsuitable for
this research. The RBDM definition suggests a process where information is structured
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broadly and orderly for management decision making. Risk-based Decision Making is
not exclusive to management decision making and organising information in broad and
orderly structures is sometimes not possible during uncertainty. On the other hand, the
RIDM definition is presented in a neutral form that does not capture the presumption of
risk or uncertainty, but rather focusses on performance measures.
As an alternative, the following working definition is proposed: “an endeavour to make
an informed decision on the possibilities of uncertain and undesired outcomes”. The
proposed is considered suitable as it does not limit the definition to management choice,
it does not assume information availability and structure, and it captures the requirement
of making an informed decision without overlooking the risky and uncertain environment
within which the decision is made.
2.2.3 Risk and security
This section builds on the understanding of risk and uncertainty from the precious sec-
tions by exploring risk in security with a focus on the analysts. The section first clarifies
who the security analysts are, before exploring their activities as reported by the litera-
ture. The section concludes by reporting on challenges to eliciting security knowledge
from analysts - knowledge essential for informing design for RBDM.
2.2.3.1 The security analyst
Understanding security experts and considering techniques for facilitating their operations
is a growing research area (Werlinger et al. 2010, Sundaramurthy et al. 2015, Hibshi et al.
2016). This may be attributed to the realisation that it is not only the novice (Furnell 2005),
but even experts require usable security (Chiasson et al. 2007), and the increasing focus
on human aspects of security in academic forums (USENIX 2018, HAISA 2019). It is
worth noting that not all security experts are equal, warranting the clarification of who a
security analyst is.
The researcher’s understanding of security analysts is expressed in the Workshop on
Security Information Workers’ (WSIS 2018) definitions of intelligence analysts, and that
of Security and system administrators which are; “one who collects and analyses data
about security matters to understand information and make predictions”, and “one who
deploys and manages security-sensitive software and hardware systems”.
Campbell et al. (2015) proposed a model for matching one’s ’critical thinking abilities’ to
cyber security job roles which could equally be used to represent the analyst’s role. Illus-
trated in Figure 2.1, the critical thinking abilities they identified are: Proactive - ability to
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hypothesize possible outcomes and come up with solutions, Reactive - vigilance and an
ability to detect anomalous activities, Deliberate - critical thinking ability, and Real-time
action - ability to act quickly and accurately. Matching the critical thinking abilities to the
analyst’s role would clearly result in overlaps, however, analysts would typically fall under
the horizontal axis in Figure 2.1, with work activities related to real-time defending and
deliberations on exploitations.
Figure 2.1: Cyber Aptitude and Talent Assessment (Campbell et al. 2015)
2.2.3.2 Security analysis activities
The previous section hinted on security analysis activities while defining who the analysts
are. In this section, we review the analysts’ activities as reported by the literature.
Li et al. (2010) discussed risk and uncertainty from a cyber situation awareness perspec-
tive and grouped analysts’ activities as prior security management, real-time intrusion
and detection, and posterior forensic analysis. They state that prior security manage-
ment activities occur before an incident and dwell on identifying the likelihood of exploita-
tion based on inherent system weaknesses (static uncertainty). In real-time intrusion and
detection, activities focus on the unpredictable nature of the threat environment such as
when or how an attack would occur (dynamic uncertainty). Lastly, the activities in forensic
analysis also focus on dynamic uncertainty as analysts explore data to establish the whys
and hows of an incident.
Investigations on analysts’ workflows and decision processes by D’Amico et al. (2005)
concluded that tasks vary from organisation to organisation, but six functions distinctly
describe analysts’ work processes. These are Triage analysis; the weeding of false pos-
itives and escalation of suspicious activities. Escalation analysis; investigating potential
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incidents from triage and tip-offs. Correlation analysis; searching for patterns and trends
in data and related incidents. Threat analysis; using additional data sources for intelli-
gence. Incidence response analysis; recommendation or implementation of a response
to a confirmed incident. And forensic analysis; gathering and preserving evidence for
investigation.
Though other investigations on analysts’ activities have mostly touched on points high-
lighted above (Werlinger et al. 2010, Grispos et al. 2015, Gutzwiller et al. 2016, Bridges
et al. 2018), there are subtle differences in focus. For example, Li et al. (2010) focussed
on phases pre-to-post incident, while D’Amico et al. (2005) focussed on analysis tasks.
In Addition, Li et al, aim to highlight the nature of uncertainty, while the D’Amico et al,
have it implied in risk.
Adnan et al. (2015) proposed a work practices model in a bid to introduce conformity to
the presentation of analysts’ activities and noted that research has mainly focused on
monitoring activities (a part of incident detection) and incident containment (a part of in-
cident analysis), while analysts’ training and awareness activities are mostly overlooked.
While these examples highlight the different analysts’ activities from a research point of
view, overlaps would be expected in practice as an analyst could cover multiples roles
and the activities may not be so well defined.
2.2.3.3 Eliciting security knowledge
There have been multiple research efforts exploring analysts’ risk decision making. While
research interests have been different, the general goal has been in understanding the
analysts’ risk perception and response thereof. A question posed by the researcher when
reviewing the literature was; what is an effective approach for eliciting analysts’ security
knowledge?
For the most part, studies have used interviews and/or questionnaires for elicitation and a
variety of techniques for analysis e.g., situation awareness (Hibshi et al. 2016), Grounded
Theory (Botta et al. 2007), card sorting (Paul and Whitley 2013), and critical incident re-
views (D’Amico et al. 2005). It is noted that studies using observation for elicitation e.g.,
Kandogan and Haber (2005) and Sundaramurthy et al. (2014) are less common and rea-
sons expressed have included analysts unavailability for studies. Kotulic and Clark (2004)
expresses that the overarching problem in security research is the sensitive nature of se-
curity operations that cause a general mistrust of outsiders, making empirical research
difficult.
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2.2.4 Risk summary
This Section reviewed the meaning of risk and uncertainty and identified how they relate
to RBDM in cyber security by providing a working definition. The review touched on the
analyst’ activities and the elicitation of their knowledge.
Based on these finding, it becomes clear that identifying an effective approach for elicit-
ing analysts’ security knowledge is only part of the requirement, overcoming the analyst
availability problems is also an area of concern. D’Amico et al. (2005) demonstrates that
the use of hypothetical scenarios (Section 2.4.2.1) addresses some of the concerns as
scenarios have proven effective at reducing sensitivity in security and promote discus-
sions. However, solutions to the analyst unavailability problem are yet to be identified.
2.3 Decision making
In this section, techniques used for analysing and understanding human cognition and
decision making are reviewed with the aim of understanding how they may be used to
facilitate design for RBDM. The review begins by reviewing the differences in normative,
descriptive, and prescriptive decision theories, before reviewing research on human per-
ception and judgement. Next, the section reviews perspectives to decision making and
awareness models, and concludes by reviewing context-oriented approaches to decision
making.
2.3.1 Decision theory
Decision theory looks at decision making from three perspectives, namely normative, de-
scriptive (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and prescriptive (Bell et al. 1988). As alluded
to in Section 2.2.1, the normative perspective focus on how decisions should be made
in respect to rational choice, while the descriptive perspective reflects decisions people
actually make. Normative methods can be a measure of what design for decision mak-
ing should aspire to promote, while descriptive methods provide case-specific insight on
areas that require improvement. On the other hand, the prescriptive perspective refers
to the investigation and development of models and decision aids for facilitating better
choice.
Distinctions in the three perspectives are also seen in their evaluation. Normative meth-
ods are evaluated by their theoretical adequacy, descriptive methods by their empirical
16 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
validity and prescriptive methods by their ability to aid and improve decision making (Bell
et al. 1988).
2.3.2 Perception and judgement
This Section reviews human perception and judgement as it relates to heuristics, biases
and mental models, and concludes by reviewing the criticisms to this line of research.
2.3.2.1 Mental models
When encountering uncertain environments lacking established norms, decision-makers
depend on their perception to analyse and interpret environments (Endsley 1995). Per-
ception is driven by a cognitive blueprint known as a mental model. In other words, mental
models are a cognitive way of understanding one’s environment through logical mapping
and are a product of one’s knowledge and beliefs (Gentner 2001). This may be a security
analyst working-out system functionality or picking out cues in unfamiliar network activ-
ities based on known patterns. As a conceptual product of one’s experience, training,
and beliefs, mental models constantly evolve as new knowledge is acquired. Similarly
different mental models are developed for different systems and processes.
Mental models may be categorised into two groups. The first is task-based where the
decision maker has little to no knowledge on a system’s or an environment’s internal
workings, so they operates through memorised sequences. The second is based on
knowledge of components, processes and their interrelation (Carroll et al. 1987). When
driven by knowledge, the decision maker has a better understanding and easily updates
the model as new information is acquired (Johnson and Seifert 1994).
Design for decision making should, therefore, aspire to design systems where the knowl-
edge driven mental models are attainable. However, mental models raise a few questions
for system design. Should system models be designed to match the decision-maker’s
perceived model, be simplified to ease understanding, or should the decision-maker be
expected to learn system models proposed by designers?
2.3.2.2 Heuristics
When faced with time limitations, decision-makers validate their hypothesis by matching
the limited available information against known patterns (part of their mental model) to
arrive at conclusions. The matching is a form of mental shortcut subconsciously taken
to quickly solve problems. For example, Werlinger et al. (2010) report that security an-
alysts identify attack activity just by spotting Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic on a network.
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Tversky and Kahneman (1973) referred to these processes as judgement heuristics
and explained that although heuristics provide quick answers when time is limited, they
are sometimes imperfect (Kahneman 2011, Fiske and Taylor 2013). For example, non-
malicious Twitter traffic could be flagged as malicious due to its popularity among hackers.
This example illustrates the representative heuristic, where decisions are influenced by
a supposed representative sample. The decisions are not completely intentional, but
subconsciously triggered by quick evaluation and promoted by time limitations. The rep-
resentative heuristic is one of three heuristics initially proposed by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1974). The other are the availability heuristic, and the adjustment and anchoring
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Continued research by Finucane et al. (2000),
Gilovich et al. (2002) has seen additional heuristics identified.
2.3.2.3 Biases
The reliance on imprecise information for decision making leads to systematic errors
known as decision biases. Biases are a product of inaccurate mental models, heuristics
and other personal factors (Kahneman 2011). In the framing bias, for example, a de-
cision maker’s risk tolerance may be influenced by how a set of options are described.
Compare an intrusion detection system (IDS) that reports 40% of incoming traffic as ma-
licious, to one that reports 60% of incoming traffic as non-malicious. In essence, the two
systems are reporting the same information, however, an analyst’s interpretation of the
two may differ (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Biases are not always coincidental as
they may sometimes be the product of conscious and deliberate action. For example, the
confirmation bias may be the product of actively seeking out evidence that supports an
inaccurate or false claim (Nickerson 1998, Endsley 2018).
2.3.2.4 Heuristics and biases criticism
The research on heuristics and biases has not been without its criticisms. In its support
is the view that it is better to wrongly assume an incident is imminent than to ignore an
actual one and suffer the consequences (Nesse 2005).
In contrast, the opposing view claims that heuristic and biases are actually not errors in
judgement but results of narrowly focused research. They state that the design of the
experiments used for these studies have embedded shortcomings. Usually, participants
are requested to select between two options having one correct answer, this does not
reflect true probability (statistical) which dwells on frequencies and not single true or false
events (Gigerenzer 1991). It has also been argued that heuristics and biases are prod-
18 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
ucts of experimental designs that cannot be replicated in natural settings (Fraser et al.
1992, Kahneman and Klein 2009).
Fundamentally, heuristics and biases are not different from each other. When they work
they are seen as a good thing and called a heuristic, but when they do not work and lead
to an incorrect decision they are called a bias.
2.3.3 Perspectives to decision making
An alternative research approach on decision making is based on analysing the context,
or in other words, the circumstances under which the decisions are made. Broadly put,
this may be divided into Rational (Simon 1972) and Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)
(Klein 1999) discussed in this section.
2.3.3.1 Rational decision making
Rational decision making focuses on the information availability context. It exemplifies
seeking the best course of action to meet one’s objective through informed analysis.
The assumption is that through the collection of information, decision makers generate a
picture of the environment they wish to act on. Once adequate information has been col-
lected, decision alternatives are identified, weighed and the most realistic (satisfactory)
option for achieving the desired goal is selected.
The opposite of rational decision making is decision making under bounded rationality.
These are situations where decision-makers aim at selecting the best option from a lim-
ited information spectrum. Selection is based on “satisfising” which denotes achieving a
reasonable result albeit knowing its deficiencies (Simon 1972). Below, we describe the
Decision Ladder Template, a model representing the normative and rational perspectives.
Decision Ladder Template
The decision ladder template (Figure 2.2) represents rational decision making by illus-
trating the generic steps necessary for decision making. The ladder comprises boxes
representing information processing activities, and ovals representing states of knowl-
edge that are outputs of the activities. The left side of the ladder represents observation
of the current state (situation analysis), and the right represents planning and execution
of actions. Rational decision making is sequential; passing through every node of the lad-
der, however, experience can lead to shortcuts in decision making represented by arrows
in the centre on the ladder (Rasmussen 1974, Lintern 2010). Application of the Decision
Ladder Template to understanding security decision making includes research by Gerber
et al. (2016).
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Figure 2.2: Decision Ladder Template (Rasmussen 1974)
2.3.3.2 Naturalistic decision making
Naturalistic decision making focusses on real-world settings as the research context in
which decisions are made irrespective of information availability and emphasis is placed
on understanding decision making in complex environments. While NDM usually takes
place under bounded-rationalities, this does not imply that NDM is the opposite of ratio-
nal decision making; the opposite is actually decision making in controlled environments
(contrived knowledge elicitation) e.g., lab-based studies (Shadbolt and Smart 2015).
Findings from NDM research have indicated that decision-makers usually satisfice due to
the limited information in dynamic and time-limited environments, and the findings have
highlighted the role experience plays in analysing minimal alternatives to identify a course
of action (Klein 2008, Orasanu and Connolly 1995, Azuma et al. 2006).
As Klein (2008) suggests, the aim of NDM research and its models is not to replace ra-
tional decision making models, but that it belongs on an opposite end where satisficing
is required over optimising. The Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model is explained
next due to its prominence among the NDM models.
Recognition Primed Decision model
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Figure 2.3: Recognition Primed Decision model (Klein 2008)
The Recognition Primed Decision model (Figure 2.3) follows the notion that ambiguity
cannot be reduced by the passive collection of information and weighing of alternatives
but through experience based pattern-matching leading to actions. The patterns high-
light the most relevant cues, provide expectancies, identify plausible goals, and hint on
suitable actions to a situation. Based on pattern-matching, rapid and good decision are
possible (Klein 2008).
The model has three variants, each relating to a higher level of certainty. The first variant
operates on the notion that when confronted with time pressure and uncertain conditions,
decision-makers will fetch for similar experienced situations from memory to understand
the present situation (pattern-matching). When a matching experience is identified, a
course of action is taken in accordance with the pattern. In the event that a matching
experience is not identified, the second variant kicks in, where additional information that
may help pattern-matching is sought. In the final variant, mental simulation is used to
identify possible flaws in the fetched patterns before action implementation. Alternative
options are only considered after the unsuccessful execution of a match (Klein 1993).
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2.3.4 Awareness models
It must be noted that this research distinguish decision making models (addressed in
Section 2.3.3) to situation awareness models addressed below. Unlike reviews that place
the two in one basket e.g., Grant and Kooter (2005), the researcher believe that decision
making models aim at identifying techniques used for selecting suitable options to arrive
at an informed decision. To achieve this, they deconstruct the decision making process
into a series of steps representing strategies for identifying and weighing alternatives.
On the other hand, awareness models aim at identifying techniques used to attain aware-
ness; they do not deconstruct steps taken to decision making, but rather identify the steps
taken for sense-making (Pirolli and Card 2005). Awareness models are reviewed in this
section because they serve as a prerequisite to decision making.
Awareness is defined as the knowledge or perception of a situation. Situation awareness
is, therefore, the knowledge or perception of a situation, essential for effective decision
making. The term situation awareness is understood in two-fold. The first as a concept
for understanding situations critical for decision making as defined above, the second as
a theory for attaining awareness proposed by Endsley (1995). Two situation awareness
models; Endsley’s theory of situation awareness and the Observe Orient Decide Act
(OODA) loop are detailed below.
2.3.4.1 Theory of Situation Awareness
Figure 2.4: Situation Awareness model (Endsley 1995)
The theory of situation awareness (Figure 2.4) divides the process to gaining aware-
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ness into three main steps, namely Perception of the environment, Comprehension of its
meaning, and the Projection of future status. Based on the three Endsley defines situa-
tion awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in
the near future.”
Originally modelled for awareness in aviation, its popularity has increased in HCI over the
past thirty years and more recently in cyber security as a theme for analysing human per-
formance in complex and dynamic environments (Jajodia et al. 2010, Hibshi et al. 2016).
Situation awareness has been applied in the study of system design to identify factors
such as attention and working memory shortfalls that limit user awareness and affect re-
action to system and environmental changes (Salmon et al. 2006).
Unlike other awareness models that present their steps only as requirements towards
awareness, situation awareness presents each progressive step as a level of partial
awareness gradually increasing through the model (levels 1 to 3). Because of its ori-
gins in aviation, some of its theoretical elements have no translation in other disciplines.
For example, the understanding of space (spatial context) is important in aviation but not
applicable to security (Parush 2017).
2.3.4.2 Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA)
The OODA loop (Figure 2.5) is an awareness model developed to strategically observe
and out-think opponents, comprising of the four main stages of Observe, Orient, Decide
and Act (Boyd 1996, Osinga 2007). Unlike Endsley’s situation awareness that has widely
been adopted in HCI and cyber security, OODA has mostly been limited to military com-
mand and control. OODA does not consider awareness on an incremental basis but as a
cumulative sum of the three stages and does not take the projection of a future state into
account (Grant and Kooter 2005). OODA is, however, unique in highlighting the need for
information outside the decision maker’s immediate environment to improve perception.
As the examples have indicated, awareness models only dwell on understanding situa-
tions and not the strategies deployed in identifying or weighing possible alternatives. A
comparison between awareness and decision making models is therefore incorrect and
misleading as awareness is only a subset of decision making.
2.3.5 Context oriented approaches
Unlike the approaches discussed above, context oriented approaches propose that the
decision making focus should not only be on the human but extended to artefacts sup-
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 23
Figure 2.5: OODA loop (Boyd 1996)
porting awareness in the decision-makers environment and the situation within which they
operate.
This view is motivated by the question; is situation awareness (concept) limited to the
mind? Stanton et al. (2010) summarised the contextual views of situation awareness into
the three groups of; in-the-world - having real-time information of the world, in-the-mind -
an individual’s psychological phenomenon, and in-interaction - the human and technical
agents and the way they interact. The view facilitates the understanding of socio-technical
systems of which decision-makers are a part. Detailed below are Distributed cognition
and Situated action - two examples of context oriented approaches.
2.3.5.1 Distributed Cognition
Distributed Cognition is a theory based on the idea that cognition is distributed among in-
dividuals (social group), between people and external artefacts, and the relation between
past and present events (Hollan et al. 2000, Hutchins 2000). A plane is an example of
Distributed Cognition at work through its distribution and coordination of activities. People
to artefact cognition may be seen in a pilot’s communication with passengers and cabin
crew through an intercom; the actual flying done from a central location (pilot’s seat) is
also mediated by technology with buttons to move flaps on the sides of the plane and
levers to control landing wheel below. Person to person cognition is seen in the direct
conversation between pilots and co-pilots, purposefully positioned in close proximity. The
plane is a socio-technical system and cognition is distributed among its artefacts and in-
dividuals to achieve a common goal (Hutchins and Klausen 1996).
As part of their investigation on errors in the design of complex process plants, Busby
(2001) identified that Distributed Cognition among individuals involves two phenomena:
cues - signals or clues used to determine how and when to act, and norms - standards
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or patterns regarded as typical. While the two are instrumental in supporting work in
complex environments, there is the problem that their understanding is subjective and
different from person to person, highlighting a need for formality in Distributed Cognition
procedures.
As an approach for improving existing or proposed system designs, Distributed Cognition
has been criticised for lacking a standard approach or reusable representative models.
In an attempt to address this, Wright et al. (2000) proposed a resources model aimed
at improving the Distributed Cognition to HCI link. The model presents six information
structures that may be used to analyse interactions independent of technological imple-
mentation. These are:
• Plan - presentation of where one is in a task
• Goal - Indicators that steer one in the right direction
• Possibility - presentation of alternative options
• History - presentation of previous actions
• Action effect relations
• State - representation of present state
While useful, the proposals above only address what could be done when applying Dis-
tributed Cognition, but not how. Work by Blandford and Furniss (2005) and later adapted
in Rajkomar and Blandford (2012) address the problem by proposing representational
models for design using DiCoT (Distributed Cognition for Teamwork), a structured ap-
proach to analysing a system in terms of Distributed Cognition. The DiCoT models in-
clude:
• Information flows - analysing information flows among the actors of the system
• Physical layout - analysing how physical structures support communication among
actors and facilitate access to artefacts
• Social structures - analysing social distribution of cognition within a system
• Artefacts - analysing the design and use of artefacts in cognitive work
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, DiCoT has only been applied in healthcare,
however, as a theory, Distributed Cognition has been used in understanding security
practices (Botta et al. 2011).
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2.3.5.2 Situated Action
While Distributed Cognition’s focus is on cognitive systems composed of humans and
artefacts, Situated action focusses on the events between individuals and their environ-
ment (situation). Its approach is to investigate activities that prompt decision making in
cognisance to the uniqueness of each situation. Introduced by Suchman (1987), it is ar-
gued that plans are not the result of actions abstracted from circumstances, rather it is
the circumstances that influence plans leading to intelligent action. In other words, plans
should be the product of problem situations.
In relation to systems design, Situated Action may be used to specify designs that are
based on common user actions in particular situations. Application, however, seems
limited to tangible actions e.g., printing.
2.3.6 Decision making summary
This section reviewed the literature on decision making with the aim of understanding
how proposed theories, models and approaches may be used to facilitate design for
RBDM. While most of the reviewed literature contributes to this research, particular fo-
cus is placed on Normative decision making from the decision theories, OODA from the
awareness models, and Distributed cognition from the context-oriented approaches. The
three are applied to the research from Section 4 onwards and are selected for their fo-
cus on investigating how decisions should be made (Normative decision making), how
awareness for decision making is attained irrespective of expertise (OODA), and the role
decision-makers environment plays in facilitating decision making (Distributed cognition).
2.4 Design
The review on design is divided into three sections, The first and second sections re-
view design approaches related to cognitive user-centricity and traditional user-centricity
respectively. The final section takes a jump forwards and investigates implications to de-
cision making after design by focussing on the effects of automation to decision making.
In the previous section, techniques used for investigating user awareness and decision
making in socio-technical systems were reviewed. In this section, approaches facilitat-
ing requirements elicitation and specification under the User-Centered/Human-Centered
design philosophy are reviewed. User-centered design is defined as an approach to sys-
tems design and development that aims to make interactive systems more usable by
focusing on the use of the system and applying human factors/ergonomics and usability
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knowledge and techniques (ISO 9241-210 2010). In addition to this, ISO 9241-210 elab-
orates that the meaning of usability is not confined to ease of product use, but among
other things includes perception aspects of the system-user experience which is essen-
tial for decision making.
2.4.1 Cognitive user-centricity
Figure 2.6: Cognitive Systems Engineering concepts (Militello et al. 2009)
User-centered design approaches that take cognitive requirements into account form
what is known as Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE). CSE is defined as “an approach
to the design of technology, training, and processes intended to manage cognitive com-
plexity in socio-technical systems” (Militello et al. 2009). CSE has been used to identify
cognitive requirements and uncover cognitive complexities, model work patterns and con-
straints, model cognitive aspects of tasks, and propose system design principles (Varga
et al. 2015, Bisantz et al. 2003, D’Amico et al. 2005). With an emphasis on understand-
ing decision making tasks within actual settings, CSE aims at reducing complexities in
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proposed or existing systems while maintaining optimal (not removing) human cognitive
requirements (Gersh et al. 2005).
As the use of CSE is in many fold, so are concepts for its application. Militello et al.
(2009) present a concept map (see Figure 2.6) illustrating the various frameworks, meth-
ods, models, and principles used. In spite of the advantages brought by a richly diverse
research area, CSE has suffered from a proliferation of terms describing what are oth-
erwise similar approaches within CSE, and the inconsistent use of terms with related
research communities e.g., Systems Engineering (Hoffman et al. 2002).
Critical Decision Method (CDM) and Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) are explained next.
The two are examples of CSE selected for their focus on critical (risk related) and unan-
ticipated (uncertainty related) events respectively.
2.4.1.1 Critical Decision Method
Cognitive task analysis is defined as the extension of traditional task analysis techniques
to yield information about the knowledge, thought processes and goal structures that
underlie observable task performance (Chipman et al. 2000). The three main aspects of
cognitive task analysis are data knowledge elicitation, data analysis, and data representa-
tion. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, CDM is one of several knowledge elicitation approaches
under cognitive task analysis.
As a knowledge elicitation approach, CDM (Klein et al. 1989) aims at identifying how
experts make decisions during critical incidents. First, the expert is asked to select and
narrate a critical incident (from experience), highlighting timeline and decisions made. Af-
ter narration, the interviewer probes the expert on key points, identifies critical decisions
and seeks their justifications with the aim of understanding the expert’s goals, expectan-
cies and cues used. Responses shed light on the expert’s mental models, experience
and training. As a final step, the interviewer probes for the expert’s views if the situation
or their knowledge and experience had been different. Outputs of the process are a criti-
cal incident and the cognition used to address it presented as narratives, flowcharts, task
steps and other forms of knowledge representations.
Critical decision method is summarised by the following four steps:
1. Sweep 1 - Incident identification
2. Sweep 3 - Timeline verification
3. Sweep 3 - Deepening
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4. Sweep 4 - “What if” queries
Due to its dependence on expert knowledge and incident recollection, CDM is difficult
to apply in situations where expert availability is limited, in novel situations where exper-
tise has not been gained or incident recollection is difficult, or due to the lack of critical
incidents. Alternative approaches addressing different aspects of the issues have been
proposed, such as the use of observation instead of incident recollection, or “the Knowl-
edge Audit” approach which allows the collection of multiple incidents when one critical
example is unavailable (Crandall et al. 2006, Gutzwiller et al. 2016).
2.4.1.2 Cognitive Work Analysis
Cognitive work analysis (Jenkins et al. 2017, Vicente 1999) developed by Rasmussen
et al. (1994) is based on the understanding that cognitive task analysis approaches fail
to design for unanticipated events. They argue that tasks are event dependent acts
that workers do, while work domains are a collection of both event-driven and event-
independent tasks (anticipated and unanticipated). By shifting the focus from the tasks
to the work domain, one can visualise the bigger picture (Vicente 1995).
Unlike CDM that purely focusses on knowledge elicitation, CWA is a framework (see
Figure 2.6) that guides designer through the stages of analysis, design, and evaluation
by focusing on constraints to information seeking which expose unanticipated events. The
framework is divided into five phases, each employing a variety of tools and techniques,
and focussing on different constraints in the work domain. Listed below are the five
phases based on Vicente’s (1999) update of the original.
1. Work Domain Analysis
Addresses constraints imposed by the physical context in which the worker oper-
ates.
2. Control Task Analysis
Addresses constraints imposed by task situations to uncover ’what’ should be done.
3. Strategies Analysis
Addresses constraints imposed by task situations to uncover ’how’ they should be
done.
4. Social Organisation and Cooperation Analysis
Addresses constraints imposed by organisational structures or specific actor roles
and definitions.
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5. Worker Competencies Analysis
Addresses constraints possibly dictating the worker’s behaviour within the situa-
tions.
The variety of techniques used in the CWA phases for data acquisition and representa-
tion are illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Cognitive Work Analysis phases (Jenkins et al. 2017)
Cognitive Work Analysis has been applied to a number of research projects. For example
Roth et al. (2001) use it to specify levels of automation, human role, and display prototype
of a ship’s combat command center. Similarly, Varga et al. (2015) use it to analyse the
constraints of distributed crewing in commercial flights.
While many lessons can be drawn from CWA, it falls short based on its Human-factors
approach to cognition. In other words, it facilitates a fit between user and equipment
e.g., interfaces, as seen in the two examples above. The approach is, therefore, a better
fit for improving usability and not decision making. Cognitive Work Analysis has also
been criticised as it promotes a focus on analysing the constraints in the environment,
and avoiding the human on the basis that they may have flawed mental models - thus
unreliable for requirements elicitation (Crandall et al. 2006, p. 250).
2.4.2 Traditional user-centricity
Unlike cognitive user-centric approaches that focus on eliciting and analysing knowledge
and cognitive complexities, traditional user-centric approaches promote focussing on a
context of use; which is defined as the characteristics of the users, tasks, and environ-
ment (ISO 9241-210 2010). For example, the context of use for incident detection activi-
ties differs from that of incident analysis activities as seen in Section 2.2.3.2. Though not
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associated with cognitive elicitation and analysis, traditional approaches have proven ef-
fective in the analysis of users requirement to inform design. A few traditional user-centric
examples from HCI and Requirements Engineering are detailed below.
2.4.2.1 Scenarios
Scenarios are stories describing people carrying out activities and their context. Sce-
nario details vary based on the design requirements instantiating their deployment and
they are used at various points in usability design. For example, problem scenarios may
detail problem domains situated prior to technology introduction, while activity scenarios
could be situated post-introduction; focussing on what users what to do, need to do, and
events during interaction (Rosson and Carroll 2002).
Scenario use in security-related research has included overcoming issues of confiden-
tiality and classified information and conveying the meaning of security properties in an
accessible manner (D’Amico et al. 2005, Flechais et al. 2007).
Carroll (2000) presents five advantages of scenario-based design:
• Scenarios evoke refection in design
Scenarios are intrinsically bound to context evoking the contextual reflection of de-
sign. This differs from design reviews or formative assessment that could be con-
ducted devoid of context.
• Scenarios are at once concrete and flexible
Design is a dynamic process that must focus on achieving the desired goal while
being flexible to changes. Scenarios help manage this fluidity by being specific,
while open for easy revision or elaboration.
• Any scenario has many possible views
Design activity has the potential of producing multiple unwanted consequences.
Scenarios afford multiple views of an interaction, diverse kinds and amounts of
detailing helping manage the consequences of design ideas put forward.
• Scenarios can also be abstracted and categorised
Scenarios help recognise, capture and reuse generalisations which address the
challenge that technical knowledge often lags the needs of design.
• Scenarios promote work-orientation
Scenarios are work-orientated design objects. They describe systems in terms of
the work that users will try to do. A design process in which scenarios are em-
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ployed as a central representation will inadvertently remain focused on the needs
and concerns of users.
2.4.2.2 Personas
Introduced by Cooper (2004), personas are behavioural specifications of archetypical
users aimed at preventing a generalised or biased views designers may have of users
(elastic user). Personas are therefore nuanced representations of a target user type that
should be addressed during design. As a representation of a target user group, their
formulation is a result of thematic refinement of a user behaviour corpus grounded in em-
pirical or hypothetical data (assumption persona) (Faily 2015, Pruitt and Adlin 2006).
Personas act as main characters in scenario-based approaches to design and are defined
by their characteristics which typically include: activities, attitudes, aptitudes, motivations,
and skills (Cooper et al. 2014). They provide feedback that enforces design coherence
and serve as a communication tool that helps validate design rationale (Friess 2012).
Persona use in security design has included facilitating the elicitation and specification
of requirements for secure and usable systems (Faily and Fle´chais 2010a), promoting
information security awareness (Ki-Aries and Faily 2017), and designing for security from
an adversarial perspective (Steele and Jia 2008, Moeckel 2018).
The authenticity and use of personas have however been called to question, citing a lack
of traceability between persona and source data (Chapman and Milham 2006). However,
some of the arguments posed by the critics have no bearing. For example, the argument
that two separate designers working on the same data should arrive at identical personas
is an impossibility. The nature of qualitative research is not to produce exact replicable
results, but provide consistency and integrity in the study design (Carcary 2009).
2.4.2.3 Goal-oriented approaches
According to Rolland et al. (1998), a goal is something a stakeholder hopes to achieve
in the future. Goals are used in Goal-oriented requirements engineering (GORE) for
eliciting, elaborating, structuring, specifying, analysing, negotiating, documenting, and
modifying requirements (Lapouchnian 2005).
This approach to requirements engineering was motivated by inadequacies in traditional
systems analysis approaches that focussed on data and process requirements for soft-
ware systems overlooking the rationale/justification for the requirements. The under-
standing is that software systems are means of achieving user goals; the focus should
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therefore not be confined to eliciting requirements for software systems, but the analysis
and refinement of user goals that would suggest software systems requirements (func-
tional and non-functional) (Lapouchnian 2005).
Though not a user-centered approach, GORE may be applied during activities preced-
ing the specification of systems requirements (early requirements engineering); these
include understanding the context, the stakeholders, their objectives and their relation-
ships.
Several GORE approaches have been proposed, aimed at achieving different purposes.
These include i* (Intension STrategic Actor Relations) that focusses on modelling and
analysing stakeholder interests and how they might be addressed in various environ-
ments (University of Toronto 2011), and Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specifica-
tion (KAOS) that focusses on analysing, specifying, and structuring goals and require-
ments using hierarchical analysis (Dardenne et al. 1993).
Below, some GORE concepts are highlighted, particularly focussing on those relevant to
the dissertation’s research theme. Detailed reviews on GORE concepts and approaches
are presented by Lapouchnian (2005) and Horkoff and Yu (2011).
• Goal elicitation
While goals drive user behaviour and represent their requirements, users, generally
have difficulty articulating them. This is mostly because goals are implicit and not
obvious; their elicitation is, therefore, better through the investigation of user opera-
tions and actions where intentional keywords hinting at goals may be identified (van
Lamsweerde 2000).
• Goal refinement and analysis
As expressions of intent, some goals are strategic, high-level and unattainable as
requirements. Goal refinement aims at providing traceability links from these high-
level goals to low-level requirements. This is done using the AND/OR goal decom-
position where attainable sub-goals are identified (Dardenne et al. 1993).
• Obstacle analysis
Goals are an ideal world view, however, the reality is goals may be unachievable
due to anticipated (risk) or unanticipated (uncertainty) conditions. Originally pro-
posed by Potts (1995) and refined by van Lamsweerde and Letier (2000), obstacle
analysis aims at taking this into account through the identification and refinement of
exceptional conditions in goal modelling.
• Contextual modelling
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Contextual goal modelling promotes the understanding that goals are not aspira-
tions occurring in the absence of a context. As context influences goals, equally
are its impact of requirements. This being the case, contextual differences must be
taken into account during goal analysis for systems operating in dynamic conditions
(Ali et al. 2010).
2.4.3 The automation conundrum
Unlike the previous sections that reviewed design approaches and implications to deci-
sion making before design, this section reviews the implications post-design. This is an
area that was most likely not going to be covered as the research focusses on the early
stages of design, however, automaton presents a special case as it both elevates and
hinders decision making (Endsley 2017).
The International Society of Automation defines automation as the creation and appli-
cation of technology to monitor and control the production and delivery of products and
services. For security analysts, it would be fair to say that automation is the application
of technology to monitor and control the delivery of cyber security services (see Section
2.2.3.2 for analyst activities). The need to automate cyber security activities and services
prompts a few questions. Which areas of security decision making should be automated,
to what extent, and what could the implications be?
According to Ritter et al. (2014), common techniques for allocating automation between
users and technology are based on Fitts’ allocation of functions known as MABA-MABA
(Men Are Better At - Machines Are Better At). The problem with this approach is that
attempts are made to automate almost everything that can be automated with little con-
sideration on how contextually ideal this might be. For example, Gutzwiller et al. (2015)
identifies that many existing cyber-defence tools fail to link information they provide to the
goals of the users, making them unlikely to enhance decision making and performance.
The irony of automation is that although it alleviates the complex decisions users make
through abstraction and simplifications, it may also result in over-reliance on automa-
tion that leads to automation induced uncertainty or out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity. Users
become complacent, lose situational awareness, and their skills gradually degrade (Para-
suraman and Manzey 2010). To put the problem into perspective - how may it be ensured
that users are capable of understanding events and making correct decisions when man-
ual system takeover is required during automated systems failure (Endsley 2017)?
The ironies of automation originally presented by Bainbridge (1983) are still prevalent in
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current systems in spite of increased research and solutions thereof (Baxter et al. 2012).
A commonly referenced solution is Parasuraman and colleagues’ (2000) model on lev-
els of automation and types of human interaction with automation. The model defines
four system functions, namely Information acquisition, Information analysis, Decision and
action selection, and Action implementation, where automation can be applied in accor-
dance with a ten-level automation scale (Table 2.2).
A point of note on the implications of automation to decision making is the need to auto-
mate in accordance to user capabilities; thus keeping users in the loop and maintaining
their awareness - which in turn improves their potential for informed decision making.
Automation level Automation description
1 The computer offers no assistance: human must take all decision and actions
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
3 Narrows the selection down to a few, or
4 Suggests one alternative, and
5 Executes that suggestion if the human approves, or
6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs humans, and
8 Informs the human only if asked, or
9 Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human
Table 2.2: Automation scale
2.4.4 Design summary
This section reviewed the literature on design with the aim of identifying suitable ap-
proaches for eliciting and specifying requirements for RBDM. The review suggests gaps
in the current practice between the the cognitive user-centric approaches used for eliciting
decision making requirements and the traditional user-centric approaches used for spec-
ifying requirements. This implies investigating how cognitive element may be considered
during requirements specification.
2.5 Chapter summary
This chapter reviewed the state-of-the-art from three areas (risk, decision making, and
design) contributing to design for cyber security RBDM as summarised below.
• From the literature on risk and security, it was identified that the distinction between
risk and uncertainty has not been made explicitly clear - analysts’ activities tend
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to address risk with uncertainty implied. Consequentially, the literature presents
a limited scope to analysts’ decision making, often dwelling on threats associated
with risk, while overlooking the effects of uncertainty. The findings suggest further
investigations to identify the implications of risk and uncertainty to security analysts’
practices and decision making. In addition to this, considerations must be made on
how to effectively elicit security knowledge and overcome the analysts’ unavailability
problem due to sensitivity in the security domain.
• The literature on decision making presented a diverse range of theories and tech-
niques that may be considered for facilitating design. Candidate techniques that are
applied in this dissertation were identified and highlighted in Section 2.3.6. A lack
of differentiation between decision making and awareness theories and approaches
was also identified in the literature. A clear distinction is essential as awareness is
a precursor to decision making that dwells on the strategies for situational under-
standing. Decision making on the other hand, dwells on the strategies deployed in
identifying or weighing possible decision alternatives.
• The design literature reviewed dwelt on approaches for eliciting and specifying re-
quirements with a focus on cognitive and traditional approaches to user-centricity.
The review did not find evidence that the traditional approaches have the potential
to support the elicitation of cognitive requirements for design. While the cognitive
approaches reviewed are suitable for cognitive elicitation, they fall short in translat-
ing the findings into design specifications. The findings suggest conducting further
investigations for adapting or adopting existing approaches.
As is evident above, each research areas presents unique problems that require further
investigations or knowledge that should be built upon. In addition, there is a gap on how
findings from the three areas may be integrated to facilitate the specification of require-
ments for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM.
Chapter 3
Research Approach
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research approach supporting the thesis from a philosophical
and methodological perspective, it presents the rationale behind the adoption of the ap-
proaches and the related strategy adopted for this dissertation by considering the gaps
between research on decision making and research on design.
Based on the research questions, designing for RBDM will involve synthesising knowl-
edge from research approaches for eliciting and understanding decision making in cyber
security (the problem domain), with research approaches for specifying design require-
ments for decision making in cyber security (the solution domain).
Review of the literature indicates that various cognitive approaches; awareness and de-
cision making (see Section 2.3) are ideal in facilitating the elicitation of requirements for
decision making in cyber security e.g., the theory of Situation Awareness, the Decision
Ladder Template, and Distributed Cognition (Hibshi et al. 2016, Gerber et al. 2016, Botta
et al. 2011, Gutzwiller et al. 2015). Cognitive approaches are, however, not ideal for
specifying design requirements. This may be attributed to methodological gaps between
techniques used to understand decision making and techniques used to specify design.
Decision making research follows a descriptive to prescriptive approach, this is the un-
derstanding of how decisions are made to then design approaches (models/techniques)
that facilitate informed choice. Artefacts resulting from decision making research typically
dwell on improving awareness and decision strategy, however, they are rarely presented
in forms familiar to designers and do not properly translate to models capable of informing
design (Blandford and Furniss 2005, Parush 2017).
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Figure 3.1: Research approach
In contrast, the literature indicates that traditional (non-cognitive) User-centered design
approaches from HCI and Requirements Engineering (see 2.4.2) are ideal for the solu-
tion domain as they have been demonstrated to be suitable for informing design (Faily and
Fle´chais 2011, Flechais et al. 2007). Traditional approaches are, however, not developed
for eliciting cognitive requirements, therefore, only provide sparse or invalid cognitive un-
derstanding (Gutzwiller et al. 2015).
Cheng and Atlee (2007) point out that successful design involves the adequate under-
standing and representation of user requirements. This implies that successful design for
RBDM would require input from both the cognitive and traditional approaches. Decision
making models are primarily aimed at understanding the problem domain, while design
models aim at informing the solution domain. In a perfect world, this would mean that re-
quirements identified in the former, serve as input to the latter. However, methodological
differences present incompatibilities (Fischer 1991).
Based on this understanding, the research approach has to take the following into con-
siderations:
1. Elicit RBDM requirements as dictated by the problem domain.
2. Construct output linking the cognitive and traditional approaches.
3.2 Philosophical perspective
Having identified the considerations for the research approach in Section 3.1 above, the
selected research approach is outlined in Figure 3.1, highlighting the relationship be-
tween the research’s philosophical perspective and methodological approach.
From a philosophical perspective, the research is grounded in the Constructivism episte-
mology; this is to say that RBDM will be investigated empirically, based on security ana-
lysts’ views and understanding of risk. Constructivism posits that knowledge or meaning
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is based on one’s view, or dependent upon a social consensus. Knowledge is constructed
and not discovered, hence contradicting but equally valid views of reality (knowledge) can
exist (Guba and Lincoln 1994). According to Elkind (2005), Constructivism is “ the recog-
nition that reality is a product of human intelligence interacting with experience in the real
world. As soon as you include human mental activity in the process of knowing reality,
you have accepted constructivism.” An alternative approach to Constructivism is Posi-
tivism which argues that knowledge is generated by scientific methods (not scientists’
understanding) and there is a single correct method for generating knowledge; gener-
ally, through quantifiable interpretation. This philosophical stand does not align with this
research as understanding and designing for decision-makers can be approached in mul-
tiple ways and there is no quantifiable truth.
The theoretical perspective adopted for this dissertation is Interpretivism which is closely
aligned to Constructivism. Interpretivism aims at interpreting elements of a study in cog-
nisance of the differences between people. The focus of interest lies in identifying what
is specific, unique, and deviant as opposed to identifying averages and representative
samples. Both Constructivism and Interpretivism emphasizes qualitative over quantita-
tive analysis (Saunders et al. 2009).
The research aimed to develop meaning based on understanding and interpreting find-
ings from the problem domain as opposed to testing the validity of a preconceived hy-
pothesis. This suggests that the research follow an inductive approach rather than a
deductive approach that begins with a hypothesis. The inductive approach does not aim
to corroborate or falsify theory. Rather, through a process of gathering data, it attempts to
establish patterns, consistencies and meanings (Gray 2016). Typically induction occurs
during data elicitation and analysis where relationships in data are identified, findings are
generalised, or theory generated. As a multistage research endeavour, the approach to
this research is to apply induction as an ongoing process where each subsequent output
is informed by the preceding output (see Figure 3.2). The approach is necessitated by
the interdisciplinary nature of the research, where initial finding from the problem domain
shall require additional interpretation and analysis to inform design.
Selecting an approach for research is unfortunately not a straightforward process due to
the un-unified view of epistemological positions and related research strategies (Yeganeh
and Su 2004, Lehaney and Vinten 1994, Knox 2004). In light of this, and to maintain
consistency, the research takes the approach presented in Figure 3.1, which is adopted
from Gray (2016).
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Figure 3.2: Application of Inductive Constructivism
3.3 Methodological approach
The theoretical perspective chosen for research influences the methodology which in
turn influence the data collection and analysis approach (methods). This is however not
to say that research methodologies should be categorised against specific philosophical
perspectives as concrete relationships, what is important is the justification of a realistic
methodological selection in relation to the philosophical perspective and research ques-
tions (Gray 2016, Knox 2004).
Two methodologies were adopted for this dissertation, these being, Grounded Theory
and Action Research.
Grounded Theory was applied in Chapter 4 as part of early-stage empirical analysis
aimed at identifying factors contributing to analysts’ perception of risk. Data collected
from interviews with the analysts was thematically analysed using Grounded theory,
where findings emerged after three rounds of coding. Grounded Theory is qualitative
and inductive, therefore, falls in line with the philosophical perspective adopted for the
research. Further details on the methodology are provided in Section 3.3.1 below.
Action Research was applied in Chapter 8 as part of later-stage research, that was used
as a vehicle for facilitating the validation of design guidelines proposed in the dissertation.
As cumulative products of the overall research, the design guidelines were applied to a
real-world organisation where a secure data handling policy was inductively designed fol-
lowing the stages of Action Research detailed in Section 3.3.2 below.
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A variety of data collection and analysis methods were used at different parts of the
research, all in line with the chosen philosophical perspective and qualitative nature of the
research. Among the methods used are interviews, scenarios, focus groups, and case
studies, selected based on suitability for the problem being addressed. Where necessary,
the methods are described in greater detail in the applicable chapters.
3.3.1 Grounded Theory
Grounded Theory is a qualitative data analysis technique that aims to formulate, test and
reformulate prepositions until a theory is developed. The approach refers to theory that
is grounded in, or developed inductively from a set of data (Saunders et al. 2009). Origi-
nally limited to the inspection and analysis of qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss 1967),
Corbin and Strauss (2008) among other things revised it to include both qualitative and
quantitative data. See Heath and Cowley (2004) for a detailed comparison between the
Glazer and Strauss approaches to Grounded Theory.
In Grounded Theory, collected data in various forms is broken into codes which serve as
identifiers of key points. Concepts which are codes of similar content are then reassem-
bled in new ways to derive new meaning. The Corbin and Strauss (2008) approach to
Grounded Theory achieves this by subjecting elicited data to the steps of Open, Axial,
and Selective coding. In the Open coding, codes are assigned to units of similar data
that capture the intent behind the observations. During Axial coding, codes are grouped
into categories and sub-categories, this aims to identify the relationship between the cat-
egories. Selective coding entails defining the Core Category (central phenomenon). The
Core Category represents the main theme with the greatest explanatory relevance and
highest potential for connecting the emergent categories. In addition to the three coding
steps, Grounded Theory utilises the constant comparative method which refers to the si-
multaneous collection, coding and memoing of data, and the constant testing of emerging
themes as codes are generated.
Grounded Theory is, therefore, an iterative data elicitation and analysis methodology.
This quality influenced its selection over Thematic Analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006),
where the steps for collecting and analysing data are linear; thus analysis can only begin
after all data has been collected.
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3.3.2 Action Research
Action research is a research strategy originally introduced in social science (Lewin 1946)
that involves learning by doing, where identified problems are resolved through active in-
tervention by the researchers and practitioners. Baskerville (1999) sparked its popularity
in information systems research and it has more recently been used successfully in infor-
mation security research (Flechais 2005, Faily 2011). Action Research is described as a
collection of research approaches rather than a single methodology, characterised by four
common points. These are an action and change orientation, problem-centricity, involve-
ment of systematic and sometimes iterative stages, and collaboration among participants.
The Baskerville (1999) version of Action Research used in this research consists of the
following phases:
1. Diagnosing
Identification of the primary problems motivating the organisation’s desire for change.
2. Action planning
Collaboration between researchers and practitioners to establish an action for re-
lieving or improving the problem. Action plans clearly stipulate the target and ap-
proach for change.
3. Action taking:
Implementation of the planned action which is the introduction of an active change
causing intervention.
4. Evaluating
Evaluation of outcome to determine whether the effects of the action were realised
and relieved the problem.
5. Specifying learning
An on-going phase considered throughout the project to reflect the knowledge
gained, provide diagnosis where the change is unsuccessful, and the provision of
insight for the scientific community.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, findings from the literature review were summarised in line with the re-
search questions to motivate the requirements for a suitable research approach. Based
on this, the philosophical perspective and methodological approaches adopted for the
thesis were presented; detailing Grounded Theory and Action Research as the primary
data analysis and research validation approaches for the dissertation respectively.
Chapter 4
Risk Analysis Practices by Security
Analysts
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents factors influencing risk analysis practices deployed by cyber secu-
rity risk-based decision makers. As part of the literature analysis on risk (Section 2.2),
a need to further investigate the relationship between decision making and risk analy-
sis practices deployed by security analysts was identified. The investigating addressed
research aim 1: Identify factors influencing risk analysis practices deployed by cyber se-
curity risk-based decision-makers.
The chapter presents two studies on analysts’ risk analysis practices. First a proactive
risk analysis study investigating factors promoting risk understanding, then a reactive
risk analysis study investigating decision making under constrained conditions that was
motivated by the first study. Conducting investigations from both a proactive and reactive
perspective assured a comprehensive coverage of risk analysis practices by analysts.
4.2 Proactive risk study
4.2.1 Approach
Proactive risk analysis (Li et al. 2010) focusses on activities that occur before an incident
and dwell on identifying the likelihood of exploitation based on inherent system weak-
nesses. This study focussed on understanding analysts’ approach to risk and uncertainty
during vulnerability analysis - exemplifying proactive risk analysis.
A total of ten interviews were carried out with analysts at three UK based organisations.
Interviews were semi-structured and held at the participant’s place of work. Each in-
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terview lasted for approximately an hour and was recorded and later transcribed. The
transcripts were coded and analysed using NVivo 11 (Hutchison et al. 2010). Ethical
considerations were made following Bournemouth University’s research ethics guidelines.
Using a participant information sheet, each participant was made aware of the purpose
of the study and the ethical procedures to be followed beforehand. Written consent was
also sought from the participants before interviews began using an agreement form. See
Appendix .1.2 and .1.3 for the participant information sheet and participant agreement
form respectively.
Questions directing the interviews were modelled based on possible situations of uncer-
tainty during vulnerability analysis that would result in risk if suboptimal decisions were
made. For example, the question ”what guidelines do you follow to help you manage
risk?” was asked during the early stages of the interview to give the researcher an under-
standing of the risk analysis practice. Questions following from this aimed at identifying
what happens when the guidelines do not work or when novel situations were encoun-
tered. E.g. ”how do you identify false positives? and ”what were the occasions when
you had to accepted risk?”. See Appendix .1.1 for a list of questions that directed the
interviews.
Based on the decisions, procedures, and workflows described by the analysts during the
interviews, risk understanding flows were modelled using DiCoT adaptations, depicting
the distributed nature of risk information (Hollan et al. 2000, Rajkomar and Blandford
2012). The models were subsequently presented to the analysts for validation. In par-
allel, the data collected from the interviews was coded and qualitatively analysed using
Grounded Theory (Corbin and Strauss 2008). While Distributed Cognition elucidated the
distributed nature of risk information, Grounded Theory complemented the process by
interrogating interview data to identify thematic patterns characterising the analysts’ un-
derstanding of risk. Participants’ quotes supporting the findings are presented throughout
the chapter.
4.2.2 Participants
The three interviewed organisations, hereon organisation A, B, and C, were recom-
mended through contacts and selected based on the requirements that they had security
teams that carried out vulnerability analysis. Participants in the teams were drawn based
on availability for interview.
Organisation A was a higher education institution with three permanent information secu-
rity analysts supported by team members from other Information Technology (IT) service
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departments, e.g., the Linux, Windows, and Oracle server teams. P1 and P2 (Participant)
were a security analyst and security manager in the permanent security team, while P3
to P5 were analysts from the support teams. The professional experience of participants
within Organisation A ranged from two to over seven years, and they were responsible
for over 1000 servers.
Organisation B was an information security practice with a core team of information se-
curity analysts. P6 was the organisation technical director and P7 the head of group IT.
P6 and P7 had eleven and two years of professional experience in the organisation re-
spectively and were responsible for approximately 150 servers.
Organisation C was a public sector organisation; the three security analysts (P8 - P10)
interviewed were primarily focused on external engagements. Their work entailed vul-
nerability analysis, information assurance, and penetration testing. Their professional
experience at the organisation ranged from eighteen months to five years.
4.2.3 Findings
4.2.3.1 Distribution of risk information
Distributed between teams
Figure 4.1: Distribution between teams
Interviews indicated that one form of gaining risk understanding was through the distri-
bution of information for decision making between teams (Figure 4.1). It was identified
that in most cases, analysts belonged to one of three teams (scan, analysis and manage-
ment). The scan team was responsible for configuring the scan parameters and scanning
the network infrastructure, it monitored false positives and passed all scan results to the
analysis team. The analysis team was responsible for verifying the findings, and identify-
ing and applying remediation. Feedback was given to the scan team on false positives,
false negatives, and updates on vulnerability remediation. In situations of doubt, the anal-
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ysis team sought advice and approval from the management team before taking action.
The management team provided guidance to the other two teams, approved actions,
sought justifications for decisions, and monitored activities. Members of this team had
significant experience in one or both the other teams.
A common trend in the organisations was the use of collaboration and workflow manage-
ment tools like the ServiceNow product suite (ServiceNow 2019) to support communica-
tion, job posting, and job status tracking.
“They notify me from the system, and when the change is happening, I get notified
as well. It’s when they log it, so the system itself notifies me when a change is going to
happen” [P2].
Distributed through intelligence sources
Figure 4.2: Distribution of intelligence
Risk understanding was also gained by the distribution of information through intelligence
sources (Figure 4.2). Other than the analysis reports produced by vulnerability scanners,
analysts highly depended on information produced by sources external to the organisa-
tions for awareness and decision making.
“There are CERTs that will send us notifications on malicious activity on the network
if we sign up to them...” [P1].
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While this is not an exhaustive list, the sources of intelligence included penetration test
and vulnerability analysis findings from third parties, Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) notifications, information from the general media, and updates from ven-
dors and threat intelligence communities. False negatives resulting from network scans
were usually discovered using external sources. The sources of intelligence findings
closely relate to those reported by ENISA (2017) on the nature of threat intelligence plat-
forms.
“...we identified new vulnerabilities so they were, therefore, no tests for them in Nes-
sus...Pen testing teams have identified some of these by trying our system” [P7].
Distributed through tools and artefacts
Figure 4.3: Distribution between tools and artefacts
Lastly, risk understanding was gained through the distribution of information between
tools and artefacts which analysts used to identify and validate vulnerabilities on network
resources (Figure 4.3). The analysts detailed using multiple tools for verifying identified
vulnerabilities and possible false positives, suggesting limited confidence in tools. Arte-
facts used included manually maintained records; such as Excel files used to list known
false positives.
“We manually scan for vulnerabilities using Kali Linux, and then we verify the findings
using Nessus as a backup” [P8].
“Over time we have identified certain vulnerabilities where we do not agree with the
rating in Nessus. We will then write exceptions in our system to change them. So when
the XML report is presented to our system, it knows that rating is wrong” [P7].
“As Nessus doesn’t link scans, I keep a record of the false positives in my Excel
spreadsheet so if I see the vulnerability occur again, I know to ignore it” [P2].
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Open Coding Axial Coding Selective Coding
Internal Awareness
Awareness
Remediation
External Awareness
Standards and Guidelines
Proactive Remediation
Remediation
Reactive Remediation
Feedback
Communication
Information Sharing
Third Party Dependency
Constraints
Business Process Requirements
Insufficient Privileges
Project Management
Obligations
Assistive Tools
Tool CapabilitiesVulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Scans
Aptitude
Individual CapabilitiesRoles and Responsibilities
Experience and Training
Table 4.1: Grounded Theory analysis - Factors promoting risk understanding
Once false positive filtering was completed by analysts, a vulnerability report was pro-
duced for remedial action. The trend was to address the vulnerabilities marked as critical
as early as possible, leaving the rest for later.
“If we got high or critical vulnerability that is found we immediately raise a ticket into
our support desk and we will prioritise that to be fixed within 48 hours if possible...The
rest of them we lump into one ticket which we work on over the rest of the month” [P7].
4.2.3.2 Factors influencing risk understanding
As a result of Grounded Theory analysis, four factors emerged that promoted risk under-
standing and five conditions that constrained risk decision making. Table 4.1 illustrates
the results from the Grounded Theory analysis with the main findings grouped under Ax-
ial1 coding. The core category that emerged from the analysis was Remediation as it had
the greatest explanatory relevance and highest potential for connecting other categories.
The relationship between interviews and themes identified is presented in Appendix .1.4.
Factors promoting risk understanding
Factors promoting risk understanding fostered a sense of rationality in the face of un-
certainty. Just as their presence promoted understanding, their absence limited it. The
factors identified were Awareness; promoted by the use of standards and guidelines and
gleaned from sources internal or external to the organisations. Communication; the ex-
1See Section 3.3.1 for an explanation of the Grounded Theory steps.
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change of information by the analysts for informed decision making. Tool capabilities;
the effectiveness of tools used. And Individual capabilities; a combination of training,
experience, and one’s aptitude for inquiry and analysis. The following quotes illustrate
conditions where limited individual capabilities were expressed.
“A lot of the decisions are based on the experience of people in that group and their
knowledge of risk and the business... we are relying on expertise and awareness of those
people” [P6].
“As far as I am concerned, we have to take the scan results as almost gospel... I do
not have the awareness of all the systems, maybe if I had been here an awful lot longer...if
I had the experience and the knowledge of the systems that were in place, I would say I
know how that works and I know how that fits into the environment” [P2].
Conditions constraining risk decision making
Constrained conditions were results of contextual mismatches between business and
security goals that were not carefully considered at the onset. The conflicts between the
goals impeded the implementation of security objectives, thus promoting uncertainty. The
constrained conditions were grouped based on similarities in goal conflicts as follows.
• Project Management
Time, cost and human resource are vital components of successful projects (Schwalbe
2014). The project management goal conflict arose when resource allocations were
not in line with the maintenance of security goals. Systems typically have an end of
life where replacements are required due to advances in technology and improve-
ments in security. When this point is reached, time and resources are required to
upgrade systems and maintain security goals. Analysts expressed the constraints
faced due to a lack of time and resources to undertake the actions.
“We know we have a number of 2003 servers that need to migrate to the latest ver-
sion of Windows server and the reason that does not happen overnight is because
of a conflict of interest in terms of products, but also because of the services that
sit on these” [P1].
• Third Party Dependency
This conflict arose as a result of a third party’s inability to provide adequate support
for their products and services. Well established product and services suppliers
such as Microsoft and Oracle usually support their services by making updates
available routinely or on demand. Less established suppliers and open source
projects prefer a collaborative approach to maintaining different parts of products
and services. Analysts expressed that although the use of such collaborative prod-
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ucts was essential, problems ensued when some collaborators stopped supporting
the products.
“We have a product that uses Apache and there is a vulnerability that needs to be
patched in Apache. Unfortunately, it is vendor supported, and the vendor does not
support that version of Apache, so we have got to accept it, to be in line with the
vendor application” [P4].
• Business Process Requirements
A business process is defined as an activity or set of activities that accomplish spe-
cific organisational goals. This conflict was identified when analysts’ risk decision
making was constrained due to the requirements of essential business processes.
For example, an analyst reported that System developers requested new tools that
seemed secure at first instance; however, the overall security implications when
considered contextually were unclear.
“The developer team are using software which they use for their internal collabora-
tion and they want to use video, but we are unsure how they are going to use the
video...we are going to review it in six months and if we find that they are using it in
a way that is a risk to the business...we would shut it down despite the fact that it is
a good tool to them” [P7].
• Insufficient Privileges
Risk analysis and remediation requires privileged access to devices and services,
the lack of these privileges resulted in the insufficient privileges goal conflict. For
example, an analyst expressed concerns about the limited knowledge and access
they had on the internal working of a proprietary security tools they used.
“We use Qualys for our external servers and website, but Qualys tend to talk back
to its cloud service (vendor run)...If you have a Qualys system on your network, it
belongs to them so you cannot change the system configuration” [P7].
• Obligations
The Obligation goal conflict was identified when there were legal, standard or con-
tractual obligation for data protection, versus the business objective to share data.
For instance, an organisation may implement the security goal to encrypt all trans-
missions of personally identifiable data as one way of conforming with the data
protection act (Great Britain 1998). However, conflicts arose when the data had to
be shared with entities lacking encryption capabilities.
“We do have challenges around client capabilities. So if we want to send an en-
crypted message and they do not have PGP or an encrypted Dropbox, then we
have to come to an agreement on how to share that information” [P6].
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4.2.3.3 Consolidated findings
To conclude, the analysts’ decision making during vulnerability analysis was consolidated
(Illustrated in Figure 4.4). Decision making began by identifying whether or not there was
a likelihood of risk. In the event that the likelihood had been identified (e.g., outdated
software), the risk source was verified by checking for vulnerabilities and the need for
response validated (e.g., identification of critical vulnerability). Where response was war-
ranted, probable conflicts were resolved and mitigation strategies identified, tested and
applied where successful. If tests were unsuccessful, or where suitable mitigation strate-
gies could not be identified, or conflicts resolved, the risk was tolerated and monitored.
In the alternative event that risk likelihood was not apparent, the possibility of risk intro-
duction was considered. For example, the Insufficient Privileges constraint referred to the
Qualys system as a seemingly unlikely risk source, though risk introduction was possible
based on its proprietary nature and unknown internal workings.
4.2.4 Study implications
The findings indicate that risk understanding is a matter of consolidated effort between
analysts and artefacts, facilitated by the communication of information to improve aware-
ness. For analysts, experience and training were essential, however, one’s eagerness
for improved awareness and aptitude for inquiry and analyses were most important. This
was evident in the analysts’ determination to question findings on vulnerability, use sec-
ond sets of tools for analysis, and the identification of alternative intelligence sources to
understand situations. The goal conflict situations highlight the importance of considering
context when defining business and security goals to avoid later stage constraints during
decision making. Analysts’ strategies for resolving conflicts are investigated in the next
section.
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Figure 4.4: Decision making during vulnerability analysis
4.3 Reactive risk study
4.3.1 Approach
Reactive risk analysis includes real-time and posterior risk analysis, focusing on activi-
ties that address the whys and hows of incidences during and after occurrence (Li et al.
2010). This study focussed on understanding the analysts’ approach to risk and uncer-
tainty under constrained conditions - exemplifying reactive risk analysis.
While seeking approaches to overcoming the limited access to analysts, a data elicitation
opportunity emerged to work with a group of 30 security practitioners undertaking a cy-
ber defence capabilities workshop in Tokyo - Japan. Participants (PT 1 - 30) were drawn
from 11 different Japan-based sectors including transport, steal, buildings, gas and man-
ufacturing. The participants had roles in security or its facilitation and experience ranging
from 1 to 20 years. Bournemouth University’s research ethics procedures were consid-
ered throughout the data elicitation exercise. This included making the participants aware
of the study’s aim, the participant’s freedoms during the study, and the signing of a con-
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sent form before the study began (Japanese translation of Appendix .1.2 and .1.3).
The elicitation exercise lasted approximately 2 hours. First, the researcher made a Pow-
erPoint presentation of a hypothetical scenario with conflicting goals which was simul-
taneously interpreted to Japanese by a translator. Having understood the scenario, the
participants were asked to discuss how they would approach the conflicts in the scenario
and were each given a form with the Japanese written version of the scenario and space
for writing their answers.
As the participants were non-English speakers, the translator2 also assisted in translating
the participant’s written responses from Japanese to English (Squires 2009). Translated
responses were analysed at a later date and coded in NVivo 11, where Grounded The-
ory was used to identify thematic patterns depicting the analysts’ approach to risk and
uncertainty under constrained conditions.
4.3.2 Scenario
The scenario was inspired by the “Obligation goal conflict” identified in the Proactive risk
analysis study. A scenario was used to avoid the complexities associated with abstract
security questions and the sensitive nature of actual security operations in the partici-
pants’ organisations.
You are a security analyst at a shipping company based in Tokyo. Your
organisation needs to send urgent confidential information to new busi-
ness partners in Osaka, however, the partners do not have secure and
encrypted communication channels approved by your organisation’s
information security policy. As time is running short, the business man-
ager asks for your advice on the issue.
4.3.3 Findings
4.3.3.1 Approach to constrained conditions
As a result of the Grounded Theory analysis, thirteen themes emerged from Open coding.
These were then grouped into four themes as part of Axial coding, namely Goals, Con-
cerns, Assessment, and Decisions (see Table 4.2). Only the first two steps of Grounded
2The translator was a Japanese secretary with regular English translation assignments, a first degree,
and twelve years experience working in the USA. A Japanese cyber security professor assisted in cases
where security terminology was not understood by the translator. See Appendix .1.6 for sample participant
responses in Japanese.
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Open Coding Axial Coding
Minimise Risk
GoalsProvide Guidance
Secure Transfer within Time-frame
Concerns Concerns
Analysing Current Procedures
Assessment
Investigating Alternatives
Analysing Threat Trends
Monitoring
Time-frame Extension
Decision
Transfer Cancellation
Alternative Physical Options
Alternative Electronic Options
Negotiate Lesser Security
Table 4.2: Grounded Theory analysis - Decision approach under constrained conditions
Theory were applied (open and axial coding) as the final step (selective coding) aims at
identifying a core category to expose a central phenomenon. Unlike the first study, this
would not be required when working with hypothetical scenarios. We detail the findings
of Grounded Theory analysis and quotes from participants below.
• Goals
To address the circumstances of the scenario, analysts established goals as a mea-
sure of satisfactory problem resolution. Goals were, however, varying, indicating
differences in problem interpretation and understanding. For example, for some,
the goal in the scenario was to minimise risk, while for others, it was to ensure the
secure transfer of confidential information within a specific time-frame. The varying
goals hinted on differences in resulting decisions.
“Minimize impacts on management strategies.” [PT17].
“Have our manager to acknowledge risks (risks associated with information leak-
age)” [PT24].
“Build secure transmission paths, and if impossible determine whether transmission
using e-mails or websites is right or wrong.” [PT3].
“Suggest the best way to transmit confidential / sensitive information within the time
limit.” [PT12].
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• Concerns
Concerns were areas the analysts felt required clarification before decisions could
be made. For example, enquiries were made on the urgency of the information
transfer, the risks associated with possible information leakage, and the business
partner’s security capabilities.
“It is fine if there is no information leakage, or if it is one-time-information-leakage?”
[PT22].
“Although we do not have encrypted communication channels which have been
authorized, we might have other encrypted communication channels. Not clear ur-
gency and necessity of online transmission.” [PT18].
• Assessment
Assessments were activities carried out to identify the best way forward. Assess-
ments included analysing current security practices for effectiveness, assessing
past security incidents to gain an appreciation of past security trends, monitoring
the threat landscape, and investigating the feasibility of information transfer alterna-
tives.
“Conduct interviews, identify the history of information security policies. Confirm
possibilities whether we are able to contact with other parties.” [PT29].
“...the information security policies for our organization and the ones for the Osaka
BP.” [PT18].
• Decisions
Final decisions made included extending the transfer deadline, proposing the use of
lesser secure information transfer alternative that were within the partner’s capabili-
ties, the use of alternative electronic transfer mechanisms such as video conferenc-
ing and fax, the use of alternative physical transfer options such as the Shinkansen
(bullet train), or opting not to transfer.
“Negotiate with BP (obtain an authorization for the transmission with lower security
level).” [PT3].
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“Propose to extend deadlines under HQ’s security policies.” [PT4].
“Facsimiles and Shinkansen are the alternative transmission options other than
websites or e-mails.” [PT11].
“...TV conference, introduce alternative options (Detailed data must be omitted)”
[PT19].
“It would be suitable to deliver information to Osaka by my own (or subordinates).”
[PT26].
4.3.4 Study implications
The findings indicate that although analysts seek clarifications when in doubt, this does
not necessarily result in goal clarification. Sometimes analysts contemplate how to achieve
perceived goals, instead of aiming to clarify them.
The findings highlight the role culture plays on analysts’ perception of risk and decision
making. For example, the bullet train was deemed as a suitable information transfer al-
ternative in Japan, however, it may not be considered a viable option in other parts of the
world. Similarly, PT26 suggested that they would prefer to physically transfer the infor-
mation to Osaka on their own or use subordinate, hinting at a culture of commitment and
uncertainty avoidance. Research by Hofstede et al. (2010) detail the influence of culture
on decision making. According to their findings, cultural influences my be categorised
into several dimensions. For example, the Japanese are more likely to make decisions
through group cohesion and avoid uncertainty, whereas, the English have an individual-
istic approach to decision making and welcome uncertainty.
Beautement et al. (2009) introduced the term compliance budget, by which they posit that
security compliance is a finite resource and the lengths at which one is willing to com-
ply depends on the perceived reward to the individual. Compliance shall be maintained
as long as its cost does not exceed the compliance threshold which is determined by
individual benefit. While the benefit in our study is directed to the organisation and not
the individual (analysts), the findings indicate that when constrained, analysts are willing
to treat security as a tradable resource hinting at a possible compliance threshold. For
example, the analysts enquire on permissible information leakage levels, or the decision
PT3 makes to negotiate transmission at lower security levels. However, examining an-
alysts from a compliance perspective is not fitting as their role is not about compliance,
56 CHAPTER 4. RISK ANALYSIS PRACTICES BY SECURITY ANALYSTS
but the enforcement and maintenance of security. As an alternative, the term Relevance
Scope is introduced to describe the analysts’ compliance. Relevance Scope is defined
as a minimum level for the continued pursuit of a security goal.
The differences between the Compliance Budget and Relevance Scope are illustrated by
using the graphs in Figure 4.5 adapted from Beautement et al. (2009), where the two
propositions are plotted using the effectiveness of a security policy versus the perceived
individual cost. The Compliance Budget is driven by the perceived individual cost and
specific to user behaviour. For example, a policy statement (depicted by a circle on the
graph) to backup work data on a weekly basis may seemingly cost an individual very little,
and therefore complied with as it remains below the compliance threshold. Conversely,
the Relevance Scope is driven by the effectiveness of security by taking risk into account
and is specific to security enforcement. For example, some staff members may slack and
forget to back up their data though viewed as a manageable cost in their compliance bud-
get. However, based on the data’s value, the analysts would ensure the policy is abided
with, as the associated risk levels surpass the minimal level for the continued pursuit of a
security goal (Relevance Scope),
Figure 4.5: Compliance budget versus Relevance scope
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4.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, factors influencing the risk analysis practices deployed by cyber security
risk-based decision makers were investigated. Factors promoting risk understanding and
strategies analysts’ use to resolve conflict situations were identified. Findings also hinted
on the role information, goals, perception and culture play in security decision making,
and the security enforcement behaviour, termed the Relevance scope was identified. In
the following chapter, the knowledge drawn from this chapter and the literature is used to
develop a normative model for facilitating the transparent fine-grained communication of
security decision making.
Chapter 5
A Normative Model for Rationalising
Decision Making about Risk
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a normative model for communicating and tracing the rationalisa-
tion of risk by cyber security decision makers. This work builds on findings from Chapter
4 and literature on security and decision making.
The chapter is the first of two addressing research aim 2: To propose approaches for
adapting cyber security decision making techniques to design.
Research on expert decision making during risk and uncertainty has indicated that ex-
perts e.g., security analysts, take decision making shortcuts when moving from ambiguity
to certainty. This line of research has been pioneered by Klein’s (1999) work on natural-
istic decision making, where it was identified that experienced firefighters use situational
familiarity for quick decision making as opposed to weighing all available alternatives - a
type of heuristics. Similar expert-decision findings are presented by Wong and colleagues
(2014, 2015) on criminal intelligence analysts, and Hibshi et al. (2016) on cyber security
analysts. While these findings are informative, a comprehensive process for eliciting de-
sign requirements for systems supporting RBDM, would have to explain more than the
expertise-based shortcuts by elaborating on the decision making steps during risk and
uncertainty.
Normative models are particularity useful for this as they act as blueprints upon which
awareness and decision making may be traced and communicated 1. Early work by Ras-
mussen (1974) on the Decision ladder template has played a key role in identifying the
1see Section 2.3.1 for details on the normative perspective.
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generic steps to decision making, whereas OODA (Boyd 1996) and Situation Awareness
(Endsley 2015) played key roles in exemplifying the generic steps to awareness. The
work in this chapter expands on these by presenting a normative model grounded in se-
curity decision making findings, that illustrate a detailed view to risk rationalisation.
5.2 Establishing the normative model
Observe Orient Decide
Situation 
Assessment
Goal Formation Information 
Needs
Assessment
Information 
Exploration
Information 
Limitations
Analysis
Options 
Generation
&
Analysis Options 
Validation
Option
Selection
Figure 5.1: Adapting OODA
Illustrated in Figure 5.1, OODA was used as a modelling baseline, selected for its simplic-
ity and easy adaptability2. To develop a model that captures security risk rationalisation
with fine-grained details, OODA steps were instantiated with comparable risk rationalisa-
tion finding from the conducted empirical studies and literature. Sub-categories were then
created under each OODA step where the instantiated steps had noticeable variations.
For example, findings on one’s ability to recognise insufficient information and findings
on one’s ability to recognise excess information were grouped under OODA’s Orient as
two separate risk rationalisation categories. Once categorisation was complete, suitable
titles were assigned to the new steps and ordered in accordance with the researcher’s un-
derstanding, thus forming the model. The following additional considerations influenced
model design:
• OODA’s final step ACT was not included as it is a product and not a part of the
rationalisation process.
• Design followed an incremental and iterative process where adaptations were con-
tinuously made based on new insight.
• Unlike the single starting point presented in OODA or other awareness and decision
making models, our findings indicated that security decision making had two alter-
2see Section 2.3.4.2.
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native starting points - one for proactive and the other for reactive analysis. Details
are provided in the following section.
• Based on the amount of detail the model captures, presenting it in one diagram
would have been difficult. It was, therefore, sub-divided into two complementary
elements, one illustrating the process and the other detailing the steps.
The model is presented in the section below, before validating it in two studies; the first
validates the model’s sequence using cognitive walkthroughs in a focus group and the
second validates the model’s application by eliciting analysts’ views on automating as-
pects of risk rationalisation during security analysis.
5.3 Model design
Figure 5.2: Risk rationalisation flow
The normative model consists of eight steps to risk rationalisation and consists of two
complementary elements; the Flow and Actions collectively referred to as the Risk Ratio-
nalisation Process (RRP).
5.3.1 Risk Rationalisation Flow
The first element is a Risk Rationalisation Flow (RRF) highlighting sequences and iter-
ations during risk rationalisation. Illustrated in Figure 5.2, RRF indicates two alternative
starting points; reactive risk analysis beginning with Situation Assessment and continues
to Goal Formation, while proactive risk analysis presents an inverse flow starting with
Goal Formation and continuing to Situation Assessment. The difference is based on the
understanding that security strategies precede incidents in proactive analysis, goal for-
mation, therefore, begins before assessment, while the inverse is true in reactive analysis
where goals are set after incidents.
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The second part of RRF consists of the three information related steps, these are; Infor-
mation Needs Assessment, Information Exploration, and Information Limitations Analysis
(detailed in sections 5.3.3.3, 5.3.3.4, and 5.3.3.5, respectively). Their adjacent position-
ing in Figure 5.2 indicates that the steps may overlap and occur in varying order.
The final three steps occurring in sequential order relate to options. These are; Options
Generation and Analysis, Option Validation, and Option Selection (detailed in sections
5.3.3.6, 5.3.3.7, and 5.3.3.8, respectively). Risk rationalisation is an iterative process
which is illustrated in RRF by the reverse arrows at each point of possible iteration.
5.3.2 Risk Rationalisation Actions
The second element of RRP consists of the risk rationalisation actions illustrated in Figure
5.3. The actions address the lack of fine-grained detail in normative models by provid-
ing context-related meta-cognitive questions at each rationalisation step. Metacognition
is defined as awareness or analysis of one’s own thinking processes, this may be ex-
pounded upon as the knowledge of knowledge (what one knows about their thinking), and
the regulation of knowledge (how one uses that knowledge to manage thinking) (Schraw
and Moshman 1995). For example, to understand the rationale behind the characteri-
sation of a situation, the question “how may a situation be understood?” is posed. The
question is posed retrospectively, hence meta-cognition. The risk rationalisation actions
also present procedures for clarifying the questions. In the case of “how may a situation
be understood?” the procedure could be through data correlation, which is the piecing
together of disparate data sets to derive meaning. By using the rationalisation steps,
meta-cognitive questions, and procedures, RRP aims at understanding the rationale be-
hind decision making irrespective of the decision maker’s expertise.
5.3.3 Step in the Risk Rationalisation Process
The eight RRP steps below are detailed below.
5.3.3.1 Situation Assessment
Situation Assessment corresponds to OODA’s Observe. During this step, the aim is to
understand how the decision-maker identifies factors aiding in situation understanding
and not the actual analysis of the situation. The meta-cognitive question “how may the
situational be understood?” is presented and expanded into four possible procedures:
• Knowledge of a situation: This is experienced-based recognition through situation
familiarity and the knowledge of normal states. For example, analysts with expe-
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Figure 5.3: Risk rationalisation actions
rience of a network’s activities could have a rough idea on how many failed logins
are generated every hour. Deviations would consequently trigger suspicion, albeit,
its susceptibility to judgement biases (see Section 2.3.2.3 for Judgement biases).
• Knowledge of evidence: This is experienced/training-based recognition by recog-
nising information affordances in an environment to achieve greater awareness
(Norman 1999). The reasoning is inductive through the identification of informa-
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tion affordances; this is in contrast to deductive reasoning used in the step above.
In other words, knowledge of evidence is not grounded on a hypothesis.
• Situational variability : This is the recognition of the dynamic elements of a situation
such as state and context. Situational variability involves understanding the present
state and aiming to understand possible alternatives by projecting future states.
Endsley (1995) gives the example of knowing how a threat aircraft would attack
based on positioning. In cyber security, this could be understanding the alternative
security implications new users and services could introduce on a network.
• Data correlation: This is the ability to recognise the disparate pieces of data that
must collaborate to achieve greater awareness. For example, the use of data from
multiple tools to validate findings.
5.3.3.2 Goal Formation
Goal Formation is a step also corresponding to OODA’s Observe. The objective is to un-
derstand the strategies used to establish decision goals, identify tensions that may restrict
goals from coming to fruition, and the determination of the relevance scope within which
a decision is made. The Relevance Scope was defined as a minimum level for the con-
tinued pursuit of a security goal (see Section 4.3.4). For example, analysts interviewed in
the proactive risk analysis study (Section 4.2) expressed that the inner workings of some
of the proprietary security products they used were unknown to them. However, based
on the product’s benefit, they found uncovering the potential risk inessential.
5.3.3.3 Information needs Assessment
Information needs Assessment is one of three steps corresponding to OODA’s Orient.
The objective is to understand how the decision-maker identifies information relevant for
decision making and the filtering of excess information. The decision-maker’s assess-
ment is based on information credibility determined by factors identified during Situation
Assessment and the Relevance Scope identified during Goal Formation. For example,
the identification and treatment of false positives as extraneous information, while recog-
nising their effect on overall decision making. During the proactive risk analysis study
(Chapter 4), it was identified that Linux servers had an ongoing false positive related
to backporting (RedHat 2017). As a false positive, analysts recognised the importance
of flagging it. While the action had no impact on their present work, it expedited future
analysis and decision making.
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5.3.3.4 Information Exploration
During Information Exploration, it is recognised that decisions are determined by informa-
tion availability and when information is unavailable, possible alternatives are explored.
The focus is therefore placed on understanding the strategies for identifying the alterna-
tive sources of information. To the decision-maker, the exploration of additional sources of
information is usually subject to available time. Information sources may be subject mat-
ter experts within the analysts’ environment, for example, legal officer, public relations
manager, or external experts such as CERT analysts.
5.3.3.5 Information Limitations Analysis
Information Limitations Analysis is driven by the question, what remains unknown? This
is presented with the aim of understanding how the decision-maker identifies critical infor-
mation gaps and the conclusion drawn from the knowledge. Information gaps refer to the
known-unknowns critical for informed decision making which includes gaps requiring fur-
ther information exploration, or gaps resulting from weak evidence and requiring further
collaboration with available data to build confidence. For example, it would be advanta-
geous for an analyst to recognise that an attack vector has been identified although the
motive and capabilities of the attacker remain unknown. Recognition of the missing infor-
mation such as the motive for an attack promotes preparation and investigations (Rashid
et al. 2016).
5.3.3.6 Options Generation and Analysis
Options Generation and Analysis is the first of three steps corresponding to OODA’s De-
cide. The aim of the step is to identify and understand the reasoning behind options
considered by the decision-maker. Based on the cumulative understanding from the pre-
vious steps, the decision-maker establishes an option selection criterion and identifies
qualifying options for decision formulation and their implications. For example, analysts
who felt their goal was to minimise risk during the reactive risk analysis study (Section
4.3), would most likely not have quick information transmission as a primary factor in their
selection criteria. Options Generation and Analysis also involves verifying if the possible
options are sub-optimal. This is where the identification of potential unwanted effects of
the options becomes crucial.
By this point, a decision-maker’s limited understanding may inadvertently introduce meta-
risk (decision risk). Meta-risk is the risk resulting from one’s decision making on potential
risk and can be in two forms. This are the risk of understanding e.g., forming incorrect
goals due to a lack of understanding and the risk of response e.g., increasing threat
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exposure resulting from the implications of a selected response option.
5.3.3.7 Options Validation
Options Validation focusses on uncertainty by verifying if there were elements of un-
certainty hindering the decision making process and how they were managed. Option
Validation also aims at examining the potential impact of failed risk understanding and
risk response. Factors causing decision uncertainty are groped into the four categories
listed below:
• Environmental factors
The environment is the situation within which decisions are made. Environmental
factors includes:
– Dynamic environments: Continuously changing environment.
– Inconsistent information: Continuously changing information in the environ-
ment.
– Incomplete information: Inadequate information in the environment.
• Contextual factors
Context characterises a situation within which a decision is made (Dey 2001). This
includes:
– Time limitations: Inadequate time for decision making.
– Situation complexity: A situation difficult to understand because of one or many
other factors.
– Problem magnitude: A situation with multiple factors to consider.
• Personal factors
These are attitudes, aptitudes, skills, and capabilities a decision-maker may pos-
sess that could influence decision making. These include:
– Experience: Knowledge or skill from doing or seeing.
– Training: Learned skills required for a particular job or activity.
– Cognitive disposition: Limiting mental models, biases, and heuristics (see
Chapter 2.3.2).
• Information quality factors
These are; accuracy, current, relevant, specific, understandable, comprehensive,
unbiased, and comparable. A detailed explanation on these factors is presented in
Wang et al. (2005).
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5.3.3.8 Option Selection
Option Selection is the third of three steps corresponding to OODA’s Act. As a final step,
the most informed and objective option is put forward as the basis for a decision. The
decision should not come as a surprise where the rationale is traceable.
5.4 Model Conclusion
In this section, RRP was presented detailing the steps to risk rationalisation. Key points
from the model include an illustration of the two complementary elements of RRP. The
first was the Rationalisation Flow which illustrated the process to risk rationalisation and
highlighted the difference between proactive and reactive risk rationalisation. The sec-
ond was the Rationalisation Actions providing guidance for communicating and tracing
steps to risk rationalisation which included procedures that provided fine-grained details
at each rationalisation step.
The model stressed the importance of information during risk rationalisation by present-
ing three information orientation steps, it illustrated the role of goals and subsequent de-
cision options, and it illustrated the importance of recognising uncertainty as an element
separate from risk which requires similar analysis. Four groups of uncertainty worth con-
sidering during risk rationalisation were presented, these related to the decision-makers’
environment, context, information, and information quality. Lastly, meta-risk was intro-
duced as the risk of decision making on potential risk which is categorised as the risk of
understanding and the risk of response.
In summary, the model highlights four main areas in risk rationalisation, these being un-
derstanding, goals, uncertainty, and response.
5.5 Sequence validation
5.5.1 Objective
This section presents a study where the Risk Rationalisation Process was validated using
Cognitive Walkthroughs (Rieman et al. 1995) during a focus group session (Flick 2014).
The aim was to validate the sequence and steps of RRP and not the model’s ability to
communicate risk rationalisation. This is covered in Section 5.6.
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5.5.2 Participants
Three participants (P1-3) were recommended through contacts; the three were security
analysts from organisations within the UK. P1 and P2 worked as part of a cyber security
team monitoring events within their organisation and possessed 1 to 3 years of profes-
sional experience in security. P3 worked for a counter-terrorism and intelligence unit and
possessed over 24 years of relevant experience.
5.5.3 Approach
The focus group was held at Bournemouth University, where each participant was pro-
vided with a copy of RRP and given a brief tutorial on its application. Participants were
then presented with the hypothetical scenario below about a data breach, incorporat-
ing tensions related to possible decisions and uncertainty due to insufficient information.
The participants were asked to walk-through RRP, comparing the model’s steps with
steps they would actually take addressing the scenario. Participants jotted down their
views, and in addition, P3 ran a second walk-through based on his experience in counter-
terrorism. On completion, focus group discussions began with participants presenting
their critiques of the model’s sequence and steps. The session ran for approximately
40 minutes, and the researcher moderated discussions and took notes. Bournemouth
University follows similar ethical procedures for interviews and focus groups. As such,
the participant information sheet and consent form (Appendix .1.2 and .1.3)) approved for
interviews in sections 4.2 and 4.3 were also used for this study.
5.5.4 Scenario
The scenario required the analysts to decide whether to make a breach on a university’s
network known to affected parties in advance, after remediation, or not at all. In addition,
they had to take into account that some of the breached data was already on the dark
web. The scenario was inspired by events that occurred during an attack on JANET, the
network used by the UK research and education community (Buller 2016).
A University’s CERT has uncovered a breach in the University’s IT net-
work, where hackers have infiltrated the student database and posted
their personal details on the dark web. While the incident seems at
its infancy, the University has to decide on disclosing the breach im-
mediately, disclosing the breach after successful containment, or avoid
disclosing the breach altogether.
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5.5.5 Findings
Having gone through RRP and the scenario, analysts felt the sequence and steps pre-
sented were justified, although the analysts might only have taken some of the three
information related steps (Information Needs Assessment, Information Exploration, and
Information Limitations Analysis). The findings were expected as normative models do
not aim to illustrate experienced-based decision, but how decisions should be made with
respect to rational choice. Opinions were, however, divided on whether Option Valida-
tion was an independent step or part of Option Generation and Analysis. P1 and P2 felt
that options are validated as they are generated and the two are not independent of each
other. We concluded that the two were independent steps as lesser experienced decision
makers would have to generate options for a decision before validating them. Simultane-
ous validation would require substantial levels of experience, the understanding the RPD
model is based upon (see Section 2.3.3.2). Having validated the steps and sequence,
the next goal was to validate RRP’s capacity for communicating the rationalisation of risk.
5.6 Model validation
5.6.1 Objective
To demonstrate the application of RRP, a study was conducted with nine Information
Systems (IS) personnel from a variety of organisations in Tokyo - Japan. The participants
were engaged as part of continued collaboration with Japanese security practitioners un-
dertaking cyber defence capabilities workshops (introduced in Section 4.3). The study’s
aim was to elicit the participants’ views on automating aspects of risk rationalisation dur-
ing security analysis. A focus on automation meant the model’s validation could be done
simultaneously with the exploration of approaches for better applying automation to se-
curity decision making3.
Under real settings, the knowledge gleaned from this study would form the basis for nu-
anced requirements for security automation that are grounded in user understanding as
opposed to default automation levels for all; which typically result in unusable systems
(Chiasson et al. 2007). Demographic factors such as experience, roles, and industry
could also be used in representative and longitudinal studies to uncover risk rationalisa-
tion norms and deviations thereof. The findings could hint at hidden biases and unveil the
need for system adaptations and training.
Findings from this study do not aim at providing statistical accuracy as the work did not
3See Section 2.4.3 for a discussion on the ironies of automation and their implication to decision making.
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have a representative sample size. Rather, the aim is to illustrate how RRP may be
applied to communicate the rationalisation of risk (proof of concept).
5.6.2 Participants
Illustrated in Table 5.1, two of the nine participants (PT1-9) had security-specific roles
working in Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), while the rest had
security as a part of other IS responsibilities. The participants had work experience
ranging from one to ten years and were all selected based on availability. For illustrative
purposes, the four participants with a maximum of two years experience are referred to
as Novice (PT1-4), and the remaining five with a minimum of six years are referred to as
Experienced (PT5-9).
Participant Industry Role Experience (Years)
1 IT IS Support 1
2 Electricity CSIRT Analyst 1
3 Printing CSIRT Analyst 1
4 Electricity IS Support 2
5 Electricity IS Support 6
6 IT IS Support 8
7 Oil IS Support 9
8 IT & Communication Engineer 9
9 Chemical Systems Operations 10
Table 5.1: Automation study participants
5.6.3 Approach
Like the validation exercise in Section 5.5, participants were trained on RRP and pro-
vided with a cybersecurity decision making scenario containing elements of risk and un-
certainty. Using the scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they
would use automation during the different step of risk rationalisation and to provide jus-
tifications for their answers. For example, based on one’s understanding, would they opt
to automate the Situation Assessment step relating to situational understanding, or opt
to automate the Options Generation and Analysis step relating to the identification of op-
tions and their implications?
The study sought to elicit the participants’ general opinion on automation, not views based
on the effectiveness of existing tools. The RRP steps considered were from Situation As-
sessment to Options Validation. Option Selection was omitted as the automation of this
step would imply a system is the final decision maker and not the human.
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Participants were briefed on the ethical procedures to be followed and written consent
was sought before the study began (Japanese translation of Appendix .1.2 and .1.3).
The study ran for approximately one hour, where participants provided written responses
in Japanese, which were later translated to English4. Translated data was imported to
Microsoft Excel where the participant’s selection and justifications were analysed by the
researcher.
5.6.4 Scenario
The scenario was inspired by findings on analysts’ abilities to infer hacking activities
based on certain types of network traffic (Werlinger et al. 2010).
You are a security analyst at a shipping company based in Tokyo. You
have been monitoring the network traffic at the Osaka regional office
and have noticed suspicious Twitter and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traf-
fic. There is the possibility that this could be an incident in progress.
Following the RRP model steps, which parts of your security analysis
would you automate to facilitate understanding?
5.6.5 Findings
5.6.5.1 All respondents
The first part of the findings represent all respondents (novices and experienced). For
this part, focus was on the risk rationalisation steps with the highest and lowest outcome.
Illustrated in Figure 5.4, Situation Assessment had the highest outcome, with seven of
the nine participants opting for automation the step. Participants felt that systems were
more efficient in detecting situational changes as compared to humans. Comments for
the choice included:
“Systems have a better understanding of network traffic and monitoring for signs of
risk” [PT7].
“We register the strings to be checked in advance and issue an alert...” [PT1].
Information needs Assessment had the lowest outcome with none of the participants
opting to automate, seconded by Option Validation with only one participant opting for
4We maintained the translator from the reactive analysis study (Section 4.3) as they had gained an un-
derstanding of our work and could provide better contextual translations.
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Figure 5.4: Automating security analysis (all respondents)
automation. For Information needs Assessment, the reasoning was that humans are bet-
ter at determining information requirements for decision making, thus automation would
not be as effective. However, participants felt that automating the validation of options
was beneficial, though it would require large and ever increasing amounts of data. Com-
ments promoting the two choices included:
“When determining the necessary or unnecessary information, one’s experience or
wider perspective would be required” [PT6].
“It is ambiguous for a system to determine unnecessary information” [PT9].
“New information might emerge fluidly; thus, automation would be impossible” [PT6].
“Although mechanical correlations could be derived by automation; automation in cau-
sation could be difficult” [PT9].
5.6.5.2 Novice versus Experienced
The second part of analysis aimed at identifying if there were substantial differences
in the novice versus the experienced choice. Illustrated in Figure 5.5, differences were
observed in Information Limitations Analysis where none of the experienced opted to
automate, while three of the four novices opted for it. Like the Information needs Assess-
ment finding above, the experienced felt humans were better at determining information
requirements for decision making. Comments leading to the contrasting choices included:
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Figure 5.5: Automating security analysis (novice vs experienced)
“Since information acquisition is uncertain, automation would be impossible” [PT7].
“If information is limited, we would be able to determine such information using con-
ditional branching” [PT1].
As an overall, the results indicate that the experienced were lesser inclined to automate
with Situation Assessment as their only selection higher than the novice’s choices. It
would be reasonable to expect that more experienced practitioners would have a better
understanding of when to rely on their judgement and when not to.
5.6.6 Study implications
The study presented a proof of concept on the application of RRP. It illustrated how
the risk rationalisation steps during security analysis could be considered for automation
based on user requirements, therefore leveraging human and system decision making
capabilities.
As expressed above, the aim is not to draw too much from the quantitative aspects of the
study due to the limited sample size, however, the findings indicate which risk rationalisa-
tion steps were preferred for automation. The findings also reveal that opinions within the
two groups were mostly similar, while opinions between the groups were mostly different,
indicting the analysts’ understanding of the model. By using the experienced and novices
as two independent and contrasting study variables (MacKenzie 2013), it is believed the
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soundness of RRP as a nuanced approach for communicating risk rationalisation has
been illustrated.
5.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, RRP was presented as a normative model for rationalising decision mak-
ing about risk. Its use was described and two studies validating its sequence and appli-
cation were presented. The model is not the proposition of a new approach to decision
making, but rather, one that complements existing approaches but adding a level of gran-
ularity appropriate for risk rationalisation in RBDM.
The model aims to serve two purposes, the first as a tool facilitating the analyses of secu-
rity decisions (communication and traceability), and the second as a baseline upon which
design requirements for RBDM are elicited. This chapter achieved the first, the second
is expanded upon in the following chapter, by presenting a conceptual model for RBDM
based on the four main areas identified in risk rationalisation. These are understanding,
goals, uncertainty, and response.
Chapter 6
Conceptual Model for Risk-based
Decision Making
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a conceptual model for designing for RBDM illustrating the various
concepts in cyber security decision making and their relationship. The model is grounded
in findings from previous the chapters but particularly builds on areas identified in RRP.
While RRP took a cognitive view to understanding risk and uncertainty in cyber security
decision making, the conceptual model shifts to a design view linking decision making
findings in risk rationalisation to the design domain. In turn, the chapter illustrate how
RBDM concepts may be reasoned about in design.
The chapter is the second of two addressing research aim 2: To propose approaches for
adapting cyber security decision making techniques to design.
6.1.1 Conceptual models
In systems design, conceptual models are an abstract representation of a system (social
or technical) presented in text or diagrammatic forms. The role conceptual models play
includes enhancing the understanding of the system they represent, promoting the effi-
cient conveyance of system details, and providing a reference point for system designers
to gather system requirements. Conceptual models also aid in identifying system-specific
concepts, entities, and entity relationships that could otherwise be overlooked during de-
sign (Johnson and Henderson 2002).
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Risk Forms RRP Steps Step’s Procedures
Risk of understanding
Situation Assessment All
Information Needs Assessment All
Information Exploration All
Information Limitations Analysis All
Options Validation Personal factors
Goal risk Goal Formation All
Uncertainty risk Options Validation All
Risk of response Option Generation & Analysis All
Table 6.1: Risk forms in RBDM
6.1.1.1 Risk forms
This chapter presents an integrated RBDM conceptual model highlighting the risk forms
that should be considered when designing for RBDM. The risk forms are used as a vehi-
cle to ease the elicitation of requirements driven by the understanding that it is sometimes
easier to elicit requirements by aiming to identify what is missing (consequences of deci-
sions), than focussing on desired abilities (Faily and Fle´chais 2016). This being the case,
the risk forms highlight the consequences of missing requirements in a RBDM process.
To ensure that a complete set of requirements are captured, the risk forms were elicited
from risk rationalisation practices in cyber security decision making (RRP). Table 6.1 il-
lustrates how the RRP steps and procedures informed the identification of the risk forms.
All steps translated to a single risk form with exception to Options Validation (Section
5.3.3.7) which translated to the risk of understanding and risk from uncertainty. This is
because personal factors under Options Validation may translate to the risk of one’s lim-
ited understanding or the risk of an information provider’s limited understanding - which
is a source of uncertainty.
6.1.1.2 Sub-models
The integrated RBDM conceptual model focusses on three of the four risk forms high-
lighted in Table 6.1, namely, risk in understanding, goals risk, and uncertainty risk. For
each risk form, a sub-model expanding on the integrated model’s details is presented,
these are: Personal-risk model, Goal-risk model, and Contextual-risk model. The fourth
risk form - the risk of response - is presented in Chapter 7 as its relationship is modelled
at a higher level.
76 CHAPTER 6. CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING
The models are designed using UML Class diagrams (Rumbaugh et al. 1999), selected
for their widespread use in systems design and their ability to represent the proposed
concepts. As an overall, design of the conceptual models draws inspiration from the IRIS
meta-model (Integrating Requirements and Information Security), a model focused on
specifying security and usability requirements during the early stages of system design
(Faily and Fle´chais 2010b).
6.1.1.3 Running example
For each model, examples illustrations are presented using adaptations of events sur-
rounding a Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack on the Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics in 2016. The scenario was identified as part of the on-going literature review during
the progression of the research. While alternative security scenarios such as the attack
on the Singapore Health Services were considered (Ministry of Communications and In-
formations 2019), the DDoS attack on the Australian Bureau of Statistics was selected as
it portrayed the role decision making may play in causing and exacerbating security inci-
dents. There also were up-to-date academic publications on the event (Ceric and Holland
2019) and reports from involved industrial entities (IBM Australia 2016, Vocus Commu-
nications 2016, Nextgen Group 2016). The event also provided a reasonable level of
complexity for illustrating the various concepts the researcher proposes. A brief overview
of the incident adopted from MacGibbon (2016) is provided below.
6.1.2 Australian Bureau of Statistics DDoS incident
The 2016 Australian national census was conducted on 9 August 2016. Unlike previous
censuses in 2006 and 2011, this was fully run online. The Australian Bureau of Statistics
contracted IBM to run the systems; selected for its successful delivery of the two previ-
ous censuses which were partially ran online. IBM approached the project by setting up
a data centre for running the census website and agreed to provide a minimum of 98%
website availability for accessing, completing and submitting census forms. Denial of ser-
vice attacks were identified as the main security concerns, to which IBM sub-contracted
two Internet Service Providers (ISP) (NextGen and Telstra), providing alternative public
access to the website. In addition, a DDoS mitigation strategy for traffic originating from
outside Australia (geoblocking) was agreed upon - to be implemented at the ISPs. On
census night, malicious DDoS attacks were successfully launched against the census
website resulting in its partial shutdown, where the first attack was at around 3GB/s and
lasted 11 minutes. Reasons for the successful attacks include but are not limited to the
following decisions and actions.
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• Geoblocking only addressed traffic originating from outside Australia with no clear
strategy for domestic traffic in place.
• Geoblocking was tested for only 10 minutes though it was identified that attacks
could last an average of 16 hours.
• The ISP NextGen did not have geoblocking enabled.
• Though two ISPs were contracted, the two had the same upstream provider (Vocus)
that had also failed in implementing geoblocking, resulting in a single point of failure.
• An attempt to restore systems during a fourth attack led to router failure, compound-
ing network issues.
6.2 Integrated model
Figure 6.1: RBDM conceptual model
The conceptual model for RBDM illustrated in Figure 6.1 serves as an overview illustrat-
ing the relationships between entities in the three identified risk forms. An explantation
for the model and link to the risk forms is as follows: At the centre of the model is the per-
sona who is the decision-maker. The persona may have personal factors that influence
or fail to assist decision making and possibly resulting in risk (Section 6.3: Personal-risk).
The persona’s decisions are driven by goals that must be satisfied. As our personas are
specifically decision makers, decision goals that reflect the desired system properties will
always be present, however, situations may arise where the goals are unattainable (Sec-
tion 6.5: Goal-risk). To make informed decisions, decision-makers can only rationalise
what they perceive; which is facilitated and validated by available information. As percep-
tion is sometimes not a true reflection of the actual context (Klein et al. 2007), it results in
contextual risk (Section 6.4: Contextual-risk). Similarly, the level of confidence that may
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be placed on information facilitating the understanding of situations may also be limited
(Section 6.4.1.4: Uncertainty). Detailed explanations for each sub-model are below.
6.3 Personal-risk model
6.3.1 Defining Personal-risk
Figure 6.2: Personal-risk model
Illustrated in Figure 6.2, the Personal-risk sub-model dwells on modelling decision risks
resulting from personal factors. Personal factors are a collection of attitudes, aptitudes,
skills, and capabilities one may possess that could influence decision making. These
are specific to the decision-maker (persona) and were detailed in RRP as experience,
training and a cognitive disposition (see Section 5.3.3.7). A persona may have several
factors whose presence or lack of, may contribute to risk. While it is unlikely that one
may have absolutely no personal limitations, we opt to say a persona may have zero-to-
many personal factors to indicate that the limitations may not be related to the decision
in question. On the other hand, similar factors may apply to one or more personas. For
example, a lack of training in an area critical for a decision may affect all lacking training.
6.3.2 Personal-risk example
Using the Australian Bureau of Statistics incident example in Figure 6.3, an examina-
tion of the analysts at the ISP’s providing public access to the census site might have
indicated that some did not have the required training or experience to correctly config-
ure the geoblocking DDoS mitigation strategy. Overconfidence (bias) might also have
clouded the ISP analyst’s judgement, as the two previous censuses in 2006 and 2011
had run smoothly, albeit a lower number of online users (Ceric and Holland 2019).
Equipped with knowledge from such analysis, designers may begin to identify require-
ments for addressing the analysts’ limitations.
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Figure 6.3: Personal-risk model example
6.4 Contextual-risk model
6.4.1 Defining Contextual-risk
Figure 6.4: Contextual-risk model
The Contextual-risk sub-model dwells on modelling decision risks resulting from the per-
ception of a situation. Illustrated in Figure 6.4, the model’s main focus is the Perceived
Context which is a composition of Correlation and Variability that were explained in RRP’s
Situation Assessment step (Section 5.3.3.1) and further detailed below.
The term perceived is used to indicate that the context is a product of a decision-makers
view, differentiating it from the actual context that is independent of the decision-maker.
In RRP, the actual context was explained as the characteristics of a situation within which
a decision is made (see contextual factors in Section 5.3.3.7).
The understanding that a perceived context is independent of an actual context has been
expressed in various scholarly articles. For example, Wong and Varga (2012) discuss
the data keyhole problem, explained as an information analysis limitation where one only
sees a small part of a large dataset due to computational or display constraints. Another
example may be found in Klein and colleagues’ (2007) data-frame theory, where a frame
is the portion of perception that is internal to the perceiver and accepts information as it
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becomes available. What is common in the Keyhole and Data frame theories, is that, like
the perceived context, they both are a decision-maker’s limited view of an actual context.
6.4.1.1 Variability
Figure 6.5: Contextual-risk model (Variability)
Variability is the understanding of the dynamism of a situation, or in other words, the
projection of alternative states. Here, the contextual risk lies in the failure to identify plau-
sible situational alternatives in the problem domain. To design for Variability (Lapouchnian
2005), actors, their goals (actor goals), tasks, resources, and softgoals are used to model
contextual variations.
According to the i* framework (University of Toronto 2011, Yu 1997), an actor is an entity
that has strategic goals and intentionality within a system or organisational setting. Goals
represent the actor’s strategic interests that have clearly defined satisfaction criteria. Soft-
goals are goals that do not have clearly defined satisfaction criteria; they are therefore
satificed as opposed to satisfied and are often used to define quality. Tasks are specific
processes actors perform and resources are physical or informational entities used by
the actors.
As illustrated in Figure 6.5, modelling of variability is centered on a minimum of one
actor, with at least one goal as an expression of intentionality. For example, a malicious
actor may have the goal to reduce access to a census site. The actor may have zero
or many dependent tasks and softgoals. For example, the task of hiring a botnet with
the softgoal of achieving a quick attack. Similarly, the actor may have zero or many
associated resources, e.g., cryptocurrency to hire a botnet. Unlike the tasks and the
softgoals, resources are only used by the actor but not dependent on the actor.
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6.4.1.2 Variability example
Figure 6.6 illustrates the Context-risk example for Variability. A few options a malicious
actor might consider to reduce access to the census site are modelled. By analysing
these options, it becomes clear that the DDoS geoblocking mitigation strategy which only
considers international traffic was not suitable as the sole mitigation option as attacks
could equally have originated from within the country (Australia).
Figure 6.6: Contextual-risk model example (Variability)
6.4.1.3 Correlation
Correlation relates to recognising the disparate pieces of data that may be used collab-
oratively to achieve greater awareness. The contextual risk lies in the inability to identify
or piece useful data. At the lowest level, data is either held by an actor or a resource,
e.g., an Excel file as a resource, not the organisation owning the file. Thus, modelling
takes the form of data flows between actors and resources. At a minimum, Correlation
involves one actor representing the data seeker (decision-maker), while additional actors
and resources represent the data sources (see Figure 6.7).
6.4.1.4 Uncertainty
As previously indicated, Correlation relates to uncertainty. In RRP, uncertainty was ex-
plained as a composition of factors relating to context (actual not perceived), the environ-
ment, information quality, and the persona - who in this case is the information provider
(see Section 5.3.3.7). Uncertainty is modelled by appending the uncertainty factors to
each identified data source, thereby, hinting on the level of confidence that can be placed
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Figure 6.7: Contextual-risk model (Correlation)
on the data and promoting heedful decision making (Cohen and Freeman 1996). For
example, uncertainty on the Excel file mentioned above may relate to information quality,
e.g., inaccurate or outdated data. There is also the possibility that uncertainty relating
to the sourced data is unknown, thus, the zero or many representation for uncertainty
in Figure 6.7. As an overall, uncertainty can only be modelled when data sources have
been identified.
Note that uncertainty is not modelled with Variability as the process is presumptive. It
would, therefore, be difficult to validate the type of uncertainty in question.
6.4.1.5 Correlation and Uncertainty example
Having identified potential alternatives during Variability modelling, decision-makers may
use this information to identify suitable sources of information to achieve greater aware-
ness and informed decision making. Continuing with the Census example, possible data
sources could be an investigator monitoring attack discussions on the dark web, an an-
alyst monitoring cryptocurrency movement, or traffic pattern logs at the ISP. Once these
have been identified, the type of uncertainty for each data source is appended as illus-
trated in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Contextual-risk model example (Correlation and Uncertainty)
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6.5 Goal-risk model
6.5.1 Defining Goal-risk
Figure 6.9: Goal-risk model
Illustrated in Figure 6.9, the Goal-risk sub-model dwells on modelling decision risks re-
lating to goals satisfaction (see Section 5.3.3.2). Unlike the actor goals discussed in the
contextual-risk sub-model that aim at understanding actor intentions, the goals here are
used as an approach for refining requirements (Dardenne et al. 1993) and are specifically
the goals of decision-makers and not actors in general.
To satisfy goals, refinement follows one of two approaches. The first approach focuses
on refining the goals themselves from a high unachievable level to attainable low-level
goals or requirements. The KAOS (Dardenne et al. 1993) definition for requirements is
borrowed, which defines requirements as refined goals under the responsibility of a sin-
gle agent. Agents may be humans, devices, programs, etc. (van Lamsweerde and Letier
2000). For example, the goal of having multiple ISPs as a backup to Internet outages
may be satisfied by the requirement to issue contracts to several ISPs - a responsibility
assigned to a specific person.
As goals are the main focus, modelling entails a minimum of one goal, refined to zero or
many sub-goals and/or requirements.
The second approach focusses on obstacles restricting the satisfaction of goals1. Like
goals, obstacles are refined to sub-obstacles, which are then addressed by identifying
new goals or requirements that prevent the obstacles from occurring. In KAOS, obstacles
are defined as undesired conditions that prevent associated goals from being achieved
(van Lamsweerde and Letier 2000). For example, the goal of contracting multiple ISPs
may be obstructed by budgetary constraints which could then be refined as a budget re-
allocation requirement.
1For examples, see conditions constraining risk decision making in Section 4.2.
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Obstacles are modelled with a minimum of one goal, but may be refined to zero or many
other obstacles and/or requirements.
As an overall, goals in security decision making are typically associated with assets where
the aim is to maintain the asset’s security properties. Assets may be associated with one
or many goals, but goals may not have a direct association with assets, e.g., sub-goal.
Assets are defined as entities of value to an organisation (ISO 2013).
6.5.2 Goal-risk example
The Goal-risk example in Figure 6.10, illustrates how risks relating to IBM’s goal of pro-
viding sufficient public access to the census site could have been considered. First, the
main goal is refined into achievable sub-goals with the hope of determining requirements.
Public website access includes determining the possible number of site users per given
time and determining the throughput required to serve the users. On the other end, site
unavailability is an obstacle to achieving the desired access level. This may be refined
as a low throughput obstacle resulting in router failure, or refined as the requirement to
contract a secondary ISP that is independent of the first to avoid a single point of failure.
Figure 6.10: Goal-risk model example
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6.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, a conceptual model for designing for RBDM aimed at enhancing designer
understanding by highlighting the various concepts in cyber security RBDM was pre-
sented. Sub-models relating to risk forms were presented, each with a sample illustration
based on a DDoS attack on the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
The conceptual model is a step towards adapting previously identified decision making
finding to the design domain, and more generally, it illustrates how RBDM concepts may
be reasoned about in design.
In the following chapter, the conceptual model is instantiated by presenting design guide-
lines, guiding the specification of requirements for systems deployed in cyber security
RBDM.
Chapter 7
Conceptual Model Instantiation
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents design guidelines and suggested implementation techniques, guid-
ing the specification of requirements for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM. The
guidelines are a cumulation of work presented in this dissertation and an instantiation
of the conceptual model presented in Chapter 6; they aim to facilitate the requirements
specification activities between system designers and security analysts as exemplar de-
cision makers addressing situations of risk and uncertainty.
The chapter addresses research aim 3: To propose approaches supporting the specifi-
cation of design requirements for systems facilitating cyber security risk-based decision
making.
The rationale for selecting the guidelines is first presented, before presenting the guide-
lines and their implementation techniques.
7.2 Rationale for design guidelines
In Section 6.1, it was indicated that the conceptual model comprehensively covers the
requirements that should be considered during design for RBDM. This was achieved by
grounding the model in risk rationalisation practices in cyber security and RRP. An ex-
ception in the conceptual model was the risk of response which was excluded as it is
modelled at a high-level modelling. As instantiations of the conceptual model, the guide-
lines address areas covered by the conceptual model and also take the risk of response
into account.
The relationship between the risk of response and other concepts is highlighted in Figure
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Figure 7.1: High-level RBDM conceptual model
7.1. As seen in Chapter 6, risk decisions are a composition of understanding, uncertainty,
goal, and related risks. Response, however, is a product and not a part of the risk deci-
sion. Consequently, the risk of response can only be considered after the other risks have
been analysed. It is this higher level relationship that made the risk of response ill-suited
during the presentation of the conceptual model in Chapter 6. The risk of response is
defined as the risk resulting from the implications of a selected risk response (course of
action). During decision making, multiple courses of action could be considered, where
selection is based on risks and expected outcomes (see Section 5.3.3.6).
The next point considered to derive a comprehensive set of guidelines was that risk is not
only in the decisions made, but that the decisions are in response to one or many risks
in a domain. In cyber security, the domain-risk is the security-risk (threat, vulnerability,
and likelihood). While the ”security-risk” is acknowledged as a way of characterising the
domain, it is not include in the guidelines as this would be moving towards the formula-
tion of guidelines for risk and threat assessment e.g., AEGIS (Appropriate and effective
Guidance for Information Security) (Flechais 2005). In other words, the objective of the
research is to facilitate the identification of requirements for cyber security RBDM, which
differs from the identification of approaches that facilitate the elicitation of security re-
quirements.
Based on this understanding, the guidelines are drawn from the four risk forms in RBDM.
Illustrated in Figure 7.2, the risk of understanding is further refined to sub-areas drawing
on knowledge from the conceptual model in Chapter 6. Consequently, the guidelines are
based on the risk forms and the sub-areas. These total six guidelines (G1-6), aimed at
comprehensively supporting the specification of requirements for RBDM. The guidelines
are presented in detail below.
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Figure 7.2: Deriving the design guidelines
7.3 Design guidelines
Design Guidelines Suggested Implementation Techniques
1. Behavioural Characterisation Personas
2. Dynamic Contextualisation Agent oriented Goal modelling
3. Distributed Rationalisation Distributed Cognition Models
4. Uncertainty Characterisation Distributed Cognition Models
5. Goal Facilitation Goal and obstacle modelling
6. Requirements Validation Integrated validation of specified requirements
Table 7.1: Design guidelines
Table 7.1 presents an overview of the design guidelines and suggested implementation
techniques. While the guidelines specify the concepts to be considered when specifying
requirements, the implementation techniques guide the modelling of the concepts through
the use of techniques from design and decision-making research. The term “suggested”
is used for the implementation techniques to indicate that applicable techniques are not
limited to the proposed.
A strict order for applying the guidelines is not specified, other than the requirement that
Guideline 4 (Uncertainty Characterisation) follows from Guideline 3 (Distributed Ratio-
nalisation) due to the way the are modelled. However, it is believed that following the
numbering would prove helpful.
The significance of each guideline is presented including possible consequences of non-
conformity. The supporting implementation techniques are then explained providing the
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rationale for use and variations to implementation where applicable.
7.3.1 Guideline 1: Behavioural characterisation
7.3.1.1 Guideline
The behavioural characteristics of risk decision-makers must be understood in order to
identify decision delimiting personal factors, where delimiters are those that directly or
indirectly affect the decisions in question.
This guideline instantiates the Personal-risk model (Section 6.3) and its significance lies in
its focus on understanding the cognitive requirements of users in systems where humans
are the final decision makers (Roth et al. 2001). Consequences of nonconforming to the
guideline may include the failure in identifying required training and experience levels,
or the inability to address the effects of cognitive limitations held by the decision-makers
(Kahneman 2002 2011).
7.3.1.2 Implementation technique
The guideline is implemented using personas which were introduced in Section 2.4.2.2.
Personas are descriptive models of users (Cooper et al. 2014) selected for their ability
to represent archetypical user behaviour. The technique avoids the modelling of stereo-
typical decision-makers that would be difficult to represent in large groups, but focusses
on representing the essential characteristics of selected groups. For example, analysts
in a large organisation might have a variety of training requirements, however, modelling
the analysts by roles, e.g., intelligence gathering or threat analysis would produce a man-
ageable set of behaviour variables from which personas are constructed and behavioural
requirements elicited.
Uncovering cognitive constructs such as mental models and biases requires the use of
cognitive elicitation technique when eliciting persona characteristics. Based on the cir-
cumstance, either contrived (controlled environment) or naturalistic (natural environment)
knowledge elicitation techniques could be used each presenting advantages and disad-
vantages (Shadbolt and Smart 2015, McGeorge and Rugg 1992). For examples, con-
trived methods such as card sorting may be limited by their designer’s imagination. On
the other hand, naturalistic elicitation methods such as shadowing (observation) or CDM
(Klein et al. 1989) discussed in Section 2.4.1 do not have this limitation, however, there is
an information sensitivity risk as data collected is not hypothetical and participants may
have limited recollection when using CDM.
90 CHAPTER 7. CONCEPTUAL MODEL INSTANTIATION
Given the limitations, the essence is using cognitive elicitation technique suitable for the
situation in question. Identifying behaviour variables recommended by Cooper et al.
(2014) (activities, attitudes, aptitudes, motivations, and skills) should also prove useful
when eliciting cognitive constructs.
7.3.2 Guideline 2: Dynamic contextualisation
7.3.2.1 Guideline
Design activities should aim at contextualising the dynamism of a situation in order to
identify situational variations that influence the formulation or direction of decisions. The
guideline instantiates the Contextual-risk model on Variability which details the contextu-
alisation of dynamic situations (Section 6.4.1.1).
The significance of this guideline lies in recognising that risk may be reduced where risky
situations are anticipated and prepared for (Endsley 1995, Franke and Brynielsson 2014).
Nonconforming to the guideline would likely result in an inability to anticipate situational
alternatives and the impact they may have on the selection or direction of a course of
action.
7.3.2.2 Implementation technique
As indicated during Variability modelling (Section 6.4.1.1), dynamic contexts can be mod-
elled using actors, goals, resources, softgoals, and tasks. Implementing the guideline
may be through the use of narrative scenarios (introduced in Section 2.4.2.1) or agent-
oriented goal modelling techniques (introduced in Section 2.4.2.3). Scenarios are easily
understood as they are presented in natural language but can be verbose when docu-
menting multiple contextual variations. On the other hand, agent-oriented goal modelling
techniques require a level of expertise for the model to be understood, but a wider range
of contextual variations may be represented easily. Applicable agent-oriented goal mod-
elling techniques include the i* framework (University of Toronto 2011, Yu 1997) and its
derivatives such as Tropos (Fuxman et al. 2000) and GRL (Goal-oriented Requirement
Language) (University of Toronto 2000).
7.3.3 Guideline 3: Distributed rationalisation
7.3.3.1 Guideline
As risk decision making is information-driven, design activities should aim at identifying
information sources that reduce levels of risk and uncertainty. To achieve this, the infor-
mation sourced from dynamic contextualisation above, may serve one of two purposes.
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First to clarify the risky situation, and second, to aid the decision makers selection of a
course of action. This refers to the difference between understanding a situation versus
understanding how to address it.
The guideline instantiates the Contextual-risk model on Correlation (Section 6.4.1.3). The
significance of the guideline lies in recognising the value of information as a tool for ratio-
nalising risk (Groenewald et al. 2017, Gutzwiller et al. 2016, D’Amico et al. 2005, Fisher
and Kingma 2001). Consequences of non-conformity include the failure to adequately
characterise risky situations and an inability to identify appropriate courses of action.
7.3.3.2 Implementation technique
For implementation, the requirement is to map out information distribution and collabo-
ration, where actors and resources are used as representative artefacts (discussed in
Section 6.4.1.3). To this end, the proposal is to use adaptations of DiCoT for implemen-
tation (introduced in Section 2.3.5.1) (Blandford and Furniss 2005). Based on the theory
of Distributed Cognition (Hollan et al. 2000), DiCoT provides representational models for
analysing information flows among actors in a system among other things. For compati-
bility, DiCoT is adapted by adding resource representations to its information flows. Other
useful representations from DiCoT’s information flow model include the representation of
information channels and decision hubs, which in this case are the decision makers.
7.3.4 Guideline 4: Uncertainty characterisation
7.3.4.1 Guideline
For every risky situation identified, design activities should aim at identifying the level of
confidence that may be placed on information sources by characterising the nature of
uncertainty.
This guideline instantiates the Contextual-risk model on Uncertainty which details un-
certainty characterisation (Section 6.4.1.4). The guideline is significant to risk decision
making as it enforces the understanding that risk and uncertainty are separate but cru-
cial entities that should equally be considered during design for RBDM. Overlooking the
guideline could result in an inability to determine the limitations of sourced information
(Toma et al. 2012, Cohen and Freeman 1996).
7.3.4.2 Implementation technique
As discussed in Section 6.4.1.4, uncertainty first requires the modelling of information
sources (Guideline 3). Based on this, the approach is implemented by appending uncer-
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tainty information tags to DiCoT information flow models.
7.3.5 Guideline 5: Goal facilitation
7.3.5.1 Guideline
Design activities should aim at verifying the feasibility of decision-makers goals and the
facilitation of their achievement. The guideline involves considering the obstacles to goal
achievement and the refinement of high-level goals. Goal formation varies based on con-
text (Guideline 2); capturing a wide range of likely goals is, therefore, necessary to ensure
systems supporting RBDM are fit for purpose overall anticipated situations.
The guideline instantiates the Goal-risk model (Section 6.5) and is significant to risk de-
cision making as decisions are enactments of goals, thus goal correctness and feasibility
is critical for outcome (see Section 4.3). Consequences of non-observance include an
inability in capturing appropriate goals and in identifying goal impeding conflicts and ob-
stacles.
7.3.5.2 Implementation technique
For implementation, KAOS goal modelling is recommended (Dardenne et al. 1993). Intro-
duced in Section 2.4.2.3, KAOS is a method where goals are desired system properties
and unlike the agent-oriented goal modelling approaches recommended for Guideline 3,
KAOS focuses on modelling system goals rather than user intent (social goals), where a
system is not limited to software but can be extended to the environment; e.g., an organ-
isational system.
Conversely, the goals modelled in this research are decision-makers goals and not sys-
tem goals. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to implement these using the agent-
oriented goal modelling techniques (i* and derivates), however, using KAOS is recom-
mended, first because it satisfies the required modelling concepts proposed in the Goal-
risk model (Section 6.5) (assets, requirements and obstacles). Secondly, while agent-
oriented goal modelling techniques support the refinement of goals, they do not support
the refinement of obstacles. This is supported by KAOS (van Lamsweerde and Letier
2000) and it is one of the modelling requirements specified for goals in Section 6.5.
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7.3.6 Guideline 6: Requirements validation
7.3.6.1 Guideline
Implementation of the guidelines should ideally produce a set of requirements. As the re-
quirements are the product of different techniques and analyses, validating consistency
and compatibility across the specified requirements is recommended (Pohl 1994, Pohl
and Rupp 2015).
This guideline is an instantiation of the risk of response. Indicated in Section 7.2 above,
the risk of response is risk resulting from the implications of selected response options
and is considered after other risks have been analysed. For design, this equals identifying
the effectiveness of the specified requirements to decision facilitation as their implication
on actual decisions can only be determined after implementation.
Implications of nonconformity include an inability in understanding the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of specified requirements in facilitating decision making.
7.3.6.2 Implementation technique
Unlike the previous guideline, requirements validation does not require modelling tech-
niques for implementation but an adherence to known requirements validation techniques.
For example, Pohl and Rupp (2015) propose the following six requirements validation
principles which help ensure the specification of correct requirements.
• Involvement of the correct stakeholders
The identification and selection of correct stakeholders for requirements audit.
• Separating the identification and the correction of errors
The separation of error identification and error fixing tasks.
• Validation from different views
Validating requirements from multiple perspectives.
• Adequate change of documentation type
The use of different document types such as natural language or models to improve
requirement understandability and expressiveness.
• Construction of development artefacts
The development of artefacts to test requirements e.g., test cases.
• Repeated validation
Validating throughout the design process.
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Designers can therefore consider adopting these principles or other suitable requirements
validation approaches during the implementation of the guideline.
7.4 Chapter summary
In this Chapter, the conceptual model presented in Chapter 6 was instantiated by pre-
senting guidelines and suggested implementation techniques guiding the specification of
requirements for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM. The selection and complete-
ness of the proposed guidelines was argued, and in turn, the difference between deci-
sion risks and security risks were illustrated. Theoretically, this implies that the guidelines
should be applicable to RBDM domains outside cyber security.
While the proposed implementation techniques are in themselves not new, the guidelines’
contribution to knowledge is an illustration of the adoption and adaptation of existing de-
sign and decision making techniques to facilitate the specification of requirements for
systems deployed in cyber security RBDM. By doing this, the presented work addresses
the research question motivating the thesis: What system design techniques should be
taken into consideration to facilitate cyber security decision making during situations of
risk and uncertainty?
In the following chapter, the guidelines are validated through application to a real-world
case study where RBDM requirements were elicited to inform the design of a secure data
handling policy.
Chapter 8
Case Study: Informing the Design
of a Secure Data Handling Policy
8.1 Introduction
This chapter reports on the results of a validation case study where the design guide-
lines for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM were applied to inform an approach
used to specify the requirements of a secure data handling policy for a charity support-
ing traumatised parents. The case study was conducted following the Acton Research
methodology which validated the guidelines’ effectiveness in informing the study approac-
hand the study approach effectiveness in facilitating the design of an intervention in the
research environment.
Summative validation is conducted to ensure that the overall output of a research project
meets requirements. For this project, the requirement was to validate that the proposed
guidelines would adequately facilitate the elicitation of design requirements for RBDM.
Several validation approaches were considered which included studies with security an-
alysts making decisions in the financial sector, studies with security analysts making de-
cision in the increasingly popular use of drones in medical care (Kim et al. 2017), and
the application of the guidelines to inform the requirements of a security-by-design tool
(Faily 2019b). Based on participant and information availability, the researcher opted to
conduct the validation work with a psychotherapy charity that was aiming to ensure the
secure handling of their client files. The anonymised name Samaritan shall be used in
reference to the charity.
The chapter introduces the research environment and problems motivating Samaritan’s
need for change, before detailing an action plan and its implementation where an inter-
vention was designed following an Action Research approach. The chapter concludes by
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validating the intervention and the research approach, before presenting lessons learnt.
8.2 Description of study
Samaritan’s main role was to provide non-paying counselling services to psychologically
traumatised parents of abused children. The charity stored, processed, and disseminated
client data during consultation service, and for police and local council reporting require-
ments. The data included the clients’ personal identifiable details, medical history, history
of abuse, and legal history.
Samaritan’s counselling services involved a team of supervisors (experienced counsel-
lors), of which their manager was one, and a team of supporting counsellors (lesser-
experienced). In addition to them, Samaritan had recently contracted two IT analysts
responsible for overseeing all IT issues including security. The IT analysts were privy to
client data.
8.3 Diagnosis
To understand the circumstances promoting Samaritan’s desire for change, two initial
meetings were set, each lasting approximately one hour and audio recorded. The first
was at Bournemouth University between the researcher and Samaritan’s manager - who
presented an overview of the charity’s operations and problems. The second was at the
charity with the manager and a supervisor; here the researcher had the opportunity to
appreciate the work environment, discuss the problems facing the charity and establish
an action plan.
Based on the meetings, the following concerns were uncovered.
8.3.1 Automation of processes
As a relatively newly founded charity, Samaritan was at a stage where their business pro-
cesses and the handling of data were mostly manual. While this had not been a problem
in the first few years, a steady increase in clients meant several processes required full
or increased automation to improve efficiency. For example, Samaritan had registered
55 new families over the 2018/19 period and was expecting higher annual increases.
Processes under consideration included data storage, processing, and dissemination.
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8.3.2 Part-time Counsellors
As a charity that provides free consultations, Samaritan depended on donations for the
running of its services. Samaritan therefore aimed at keeping its running costs at a mini-
mum where all counsellors worked on a voluntary and temporary basis, with the freedom
to work for other charities and organisations. The temporal nature of the counsellors’
work made it difficult to ensure they understood Samaritan’s secure data handling expec-
tations. A couple of policies around risk were in place, however, none with a focus on
secure data handling.
8.3.3 IT staff
While IT/security staff typically take a lead in the design, development, and implemen-
tation of security artefacts e.g., security policies. Samaritan’s two IT analysts were both
relatively new and were also on a part-time basis. Consequently, they did not have the
knowledge of Samaritan’s data handling activities to enforce rules, nor did they have time
to comprehensively study organisational activities and decision making processes to es-
tablish secure data handling procedures.
8.3.4 GDPR concerns
At the time of the study, it had been a little over a year since the enforcement of the
General Data Protection Regulation GDPR, the then-new European framework for data
protection laws. Samaritan had not tested for GDPR compliance, however, they recog-
nised that a secure data handling process was a step towards it. Security enforcement
falls in line with GDPR’s 6th principle where it is recommended that process should be
in place for ensuring data integrity and confidentiality. While GDPR states the require-
ments, it is up to an organisation to identify implementation techniques such as following
ISO 27001 that proves a level of commitment to cyber security.
8.4 Action planning
Based on the concerns identified during diagnosis, the researcher proposed the design
of a secure data handling policy that would act as a reference point for addressing the
concerns. A RBDM design approach was deemed useful as the issues in the study en-
vironment were not only limited to security, but the need to understand decision making
strategies and its facilitation were also identified. For example, what information sources
were the counsellors using in their decision making about clients, how could the informa-
tion affect their perception of the clients and consequently affect the treatment of data?
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Following this, the policy was going to focus on data security and also consider decision
making requirements such as the desired characteristics of a decision-maker. The re-
searcher was to take the lead eliciting requirements for the design of the secure data
handling policy with the following considerations.
8.4.1 Scope
To identify areas of risk in client data handling, it was agreed that the study would fo-
cus on counselling decision making and work processes. Findings thereof would inform
requirements for the design of a secure data handling policy aiding the counsellors and
facilitating IT security expectations.
In addition to the clients’ data, Samaritan also held data on the charity’s staff and trustees.
These were agreed to be out of scope.
8.4.2 Data collection
8.4.2.1 Interviews
To ensure a free presentation of work practices and decision making, it was agreed that
data would be collected using one to one interviews. Two supervisors, two counsellors
and one IT analyst were selected by the manager for the interviews. The different roles
aided the elicitation of requirements from multiple perspectives (Pohl and Rupp 2015).
Interviews were to be conducted over a two week period with details illustrated in Ta-
ble 8.1. The manager’s availability was assured during the interview days or via email
throughout the course of the study.
Date Location Interviewee Duration
13/06/19 Samaritan’s Office Supervisor Approximately 1 hour
18/06/19 Samaritan’s Office Supervisor Approximately 30 minutes
18/06/19 Samaritan’s Office Counsellor Approximately 1 hour
19/06/19 Samaritan’s Office IT analyst Approximately 30 minutes
20/06/19 Samaritan’s Office Counsellor Approximately 30 minutes
Table 8.1: Data elicitation interview schedule
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8.4.2.2 Interviews procedure
Based on the two initial interviews, it was identified that eliciting relevant work process
data that was capable of revealing risk decision making strategies was going to be a chal-
lenge. This was because the primary risk based decision-makers were the counsellors
and not the IT staff accustomed to expressing risk from a security perspective. The coun-
sellors’ idea of risk mainly related to client well-being.
To address the problem, inspiration was dawn from an approach used to analyse the
efficiency of algorithms by testing their performance on best, average, and worst cases
(Heineman et al. 2016, p. 14). The approach yields possible risks and uncertainties to
algorithm performance under presented conditions. Similarly, the counsellors could be
asked to detail probable best, optimal, and worst (BOW) cases on issues relating to client
data handling and decision making; thereby, revealing data handling risks and uncertain-
ties in their work practices.
Interviews therefore aimed at understanding BOW cases on the security (confidentiality,
integrity, availability) of client data during access, storage, processing, and dissemination
activities, and on the availability of information facilitating decision making on client data.
With consent received, audio recordings were to be made in all interviews.
8.4.2.3 Available resources
In addition to the interviews, documents used during the work processes and policies
guiding staff conduct were to be made available to the researcher. For confidentiality,
blank documents or templates were to be provided where applicable. Below is a list of
the policies relating to the counselling services that were made available.
• Confidentiality policy
Describing organisation confidentially expectations and practices during Samari-
tan’s service delivery (directed at clients and employees).
• Privacy policy
Describing the use of personal data (directed at clients and donors).
• Risk Assessment register
Used to register organisation-wide risks and response actions (directed at employ-
ees).
• Lone working policy
Describing general risk considerations for employees working alone and without
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close or direct supervision (directed at employees).
• Counselling policy
Describing general expectations relating to ethics, trust and confidentiality during
counselling services (directed at employees).
• Safeguarding policy
Describing the procedures for addressing signs of possible child abuse (directed at
employees).
8.4.3 Data analysis - applying RBDM design guidelines
Having set the interviews, the application of the design guidelines was planned to follow
a series of phases as illustrated in Table 8.2. For each phase, the table presents the
activity carried out and the technique used, it presents input data sources and expected
outputs, and lastly, it presents the tools used in support of the phase and guideline.
Functionality offered by the tools used is as follows; NVivo: for qualitative data analysis
(Hutchison et al. 2010). Microsoft Visio: for diagram design. jUCMNav: a graphical editor
for modelling, analysis and transformations with the user requirements notations (Amyot
2017). CAIRIS: an open-source platform for building security and usability into software
that supports various usability, security, and Requirements Engineering techniques (Faily
2018 2019a).
Phase Activity Technique Input Output Tool Support
1 Interviews analysis Thematic analysis BOW cases interviews Thematic categories NVivo
2 Behavioural characterisation Persona Phase 1 output Behavioural considerations NVivo & CAIRIS
3 Dynamic contextualisation GRL Phase 1 output Dynamic considerations jUCMNav
4 Distributed rationalisation DiCoT Phase 1 output & sourced documents Correlation considerations Microsoft Visio
5 Uncertainty characterisation DiCoT Phase 1 & 4 output Uncertainty verification Microsoft Visio
6 Goal facilitation KAOS Phase 1 & 4 output Goal satisfaction considerations CAIRIS
1-6 Requirements validation Varying Phase 1-6 Validated requirements N/A
Table 8.2: Application of design guidelines
Phases
• Phase 1: Interview analysis
An initial interview analysis phase was incorporated to the guideline to serve as
a source of refined data for the guidelines. Interview data was to be analysed
thematically and coded with the guideline titles denoting categories. For example,
codes relating to obstacles and conflicts in decision goals would be codded under
the goal facilitation guideline.
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• Phase 2: Behaviour characterisation
The second phase involves identifying required characteristics the counsellor should
possess as risk-based decision makers in the study environment. From the inter-
view data, persona(s) would be developed to capture the required decision making
characteristics specified by the guideline as minimum training, experience, and be-
haviour traits. Modelling would follow the behaviour variables recommended by
Cooper et al. (2014) (see Section 7.3.1).
• Phase 3: Dynamic contextualisation
Using interview data, situational variations that could result in risk were to be con-
sidered in the third phase, where mitigations to risks would inform secure data han-
dling policy statements. However, the dynamic contextualisation guideline does not
specify what the situational variants could be as they are determined by the study
environment (see Section 7.3.2). As the focus is on data handling procedures,
variants could relate to data access, processing, storage, and dissemination. For
each variant, the guideline recommends considering the actors, their goals, their
softgoals, tasks and resources.
• Phase 4 & 5: Distributed rationalisation and Uncertainty characterisation.
As the uncertainty characterisation guideline (see Section 7.3.4) is dependent on
the distributed rationalisation guideline (see Section 7.3.3), the fourth and fifth phases
were implemented simultaneously. The phase would involve using both interview
data and documents provided by the charity to identify information sources facilitat-
ing decision making; results of which would inform, information sourcing policy re-
quirements. The distributed rationalisation guideline states that information sources
shall be in the form of actors and resources. The level of confidence that may be
placed on every information source identified would then be determined by enquiry
during the interviews or through document reviews. As a generic modelling tool,
Microsoft Visio was selected for the two phases as the technique used is mostly
developed by the researcher and not supporting by specific tools.
• Phase 6: Goal facilitation
For the sixth phase, conflicts and obstacles in the counsellors’ decisions and ac-
tivities were to be considered; mitigations of which would inform policy statements.
Conflicts and obstacles under consideration would be those limiting decision mak-
ing, thus input would be decision facilitators identified in phase four and the inter-
view data.
• Requirements validation
The final phase is an ongoing requirements validation from the first to last phase.
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8.4.4 Output and Validation
Samaritan’s manager was informed that the design process would first require the mod-
elling of design artefacts before requirements could be specified. It was agreed that these
and any concerns would be discussed via email as the study progressed.
One validation meeting was agreed upon at study completion. Validation was going to
consider:
• The necessity of policy statements
• Omitted policy statements
• Validity of the risks addressed in the policy statements
• Clarity of policy statements
• Repetitions in the statements
• Repetitions relating to other Samaritan policies
8.5 Action taking
8.5.1 Thematic categorisation
Category Subcategory Interview Sources Codes
Behavioural characterisation
Activities 4 15
Attitudes 4 21
Skills 3 16
Motivations 2 6
Aptitude 3 3
Dynamic contextualisation
Storage 3 20
Dissemination 3 15
Access 4 6
Processing 0 0
Distributed rationalisation
Artefacts 2 4
Actors 4 9
Goal facilitation
Obstacles 0 0
Conflicts 0 0
Table 8.3: Thematic analysis of interview data
After receiving approval for audio recordings, each interview was recorded and tran-
scribed. Thematic analysis (Saldana 2015) was then conducted on the interview data
using Nvivo. Coding was only conducted on the four interviews with the counsellors and
supervisors. The interview with the IT analyst was omitted as they had limited knowledge
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of the organisation and their interview had only focussed on their expectations. Coding
was to the four predefined categories representing the design guidelines illustrated in Ta-
ble 8.3.
The approach was beneficial as it meant analysis work during the application of each
guideline would solely focus on relevant coded data as opposed to the entire corpus.
This, in turn, speeded data analysis.
As a result of the thematic analysis, two observations were made. First, it was identified
that there were no data processing risks as codes did not emerge relating to this. This
was an accurate representation of operations at Samaritan, as the only data processed
was numerical for council reporting purposes.
Second, there were no codes for Goal facilitation. Analysis of the data did not produce
substantial conflicts or obstacles relating to data handling - which are the two codes un-
der goal facilitation. Further details on the finding are provided in Section 8.5.5 below.
8.5.2 Behavioural characterisation
The behavioural characterisation guideline was applied to identify characteristics required
for counsellors to ably make secure data handling decisions.
Using the thematically analysed interview data as an input (Activities, Attitudes, Skills,
Motivations, and Aptitude), a persona - Mary Hughes was modelled in CAIRIS represent-
ing an archetypical counsellor with the desired training and cognitive disposition.
The initial plan was to model two personas; one representing a supervisor and the other
a councillor, however, experience was the only clear difference between the two, making
a second persona unnecessary.
Modelling the persona and deriving policy requirements was based on desired behaviour
attributes or the mitigation of undesired attributes.
For example, an interviewee said “As therapists, we are members of the BACP, I go there
to see a lot on ethics”. This represents a desired behaviour attribute and was coded
as a skill (skills improved by membership). The attribute informed the requirement for
professionalism and the following policy statement was specified: Counsellors shall be
registered with the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) or sim-
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ilar professional bodies.
An example of an undesired behaviour attribute may be seen in the following interview
quote: ”Our relationship is based on trust, if I go snooping around on social media, it
would affect my judgment with my clients”. This was coded as an attitude. The attribute
informed the requirement for trust and is reflected in the following specified policy state-
ment: Seeking and sharing information from, or with sources such as social media is
strictly prohibited.
Figure 8.1 is an illustrative example of Mary as modelled in CAIRIS. A complete persona
description is found under Appendix .2.1.
Figure 8.1: Persona - Counsellor
Findings from behavioural characterisation guideline contributed to Section - 2 ‘Counsel-
lors’ of the policy. See Appendix .2.2.
8.5.3 Dynamic contextualisation
The dynamic contextualisation guideline was applied to identify situational variations that
could cause risks in the counsellors’ data handling decisions and activities.
The thematically analysed interview data used for this guideline was coded in accor-
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dance with data handling activities (storage, dissemination, and access) to capture the
dynamism of the environment. As indicated in Section 8.5.1, there were no codes for
data processing due to the nature of the charity’s operations.
8.5.3.1 Resources
To apply the guideline, resources Samaritan used to store data for the provision of coun-
selling services were first identified. These were paper-based files and folder, mobile
phones, computers, electronic backup devices, and filing cabinets. The following inter-
view quotes are examples of where resources were elicited:
“Her laptop has the Excel form and a Word document that helps her track the active
files.”
“Sometimes people send a long text back, saying these things have happened but
there are no names, just the first name and ID number.”
As vital parts of Samaritan’s data handling activities, the requirement to protect the re-
sources was identified. In essence, the resources are assets, as they are entities of value
to the charity. Findings informed Section - 1 of the policy on securing assets (see Ap-
pendix .2.2).
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Figure 8.2: Contextualising client data handling
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8.5.3.2 Contextualisation
After resource identification, GRL (introduced in Section 7.3.2.2) supported by jUCMNav
was used to model alternative data handling situations. Based on the analysis of activi-
ties from the interviews, three contextual models were designed; the first for storage and
access of paper-based files, the second for storage and access of electronic files, and
the third for data dissemination.
Figure 8.2 is the secure storage model for paper-based files. It indicates that the coun-
sellors could either anonymise notes or restrict their access. By restricting access, the
counsellor would have to clear their desk and ensure the notes were placed in a secure
cabinet. However, the security actions reduce the counsellor’s efficiency and could easily
be ignored. In addition, the counsellor had to wait for the supervisor to unlock the cabinet
increasing the reasons for circumventing security procedures.
Requirements were specified based on desired events in the model or as mitigations to
risks identified. For example, the model in 8.2 indicates the need for a clean desk policy
statement and highlights the risk of non-conformity to security procedures resulting from
reduced work efficiency.
The main risks identified in the contextual models are summarised in Table 8.4.
Findings from implementing the dynamic contextualisation guideline contributed to Sec-
tions 4, 5, and 6 of the policy. See Appendix .2.2.
Process Risk
Data storage Paper-based file
Data storage Backup devices
Data storage Mobile phones in office & transit
Data access Unlocked filing cabinets
Data access Unlocked offices
Data access Weak access protection on computers
Data access Confidential messages in phones
Data access Dated physical of logical dates
Data access Exposed confidential client notes
Data access Data lost due to single point of failure
Data dissemination Data provided to unauthorised entities
Table 8.4: Dynamic contextualisation risk summary
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8.5.4 Distributed rationalisation and Uncertainty characterisation
The distributed rationalisation and the uncertainty characterisation guidelines were ap-
plied to the study to serve three purposes. First, to identify information sources facilitat-
ing the counsellors’ decision making; second, to verify the level of confidence that could
be placed on the information sources; and third, to identify the authorised personnel and
entities confidential client data could be shared with.
Based on the output of the thematically analysed interviews, two sources of information
facilitating the counsellors’ decision making were identified.
The first were policies and guidelines internally or externally sourced. Samaritan’s poli-
cies and guidelines relevant for secure data handling are listed in Section 8.4.2.3. Exter-
nally sourced guidelines include those from the British Association for Counselling and
Psychotherapy, and similar professional bodies.
The second source of information facilitating the counsellors’ decision making consisted
of various personnel. These included the supervisors, buddies; who were experienced
colleagues assigned by Samaritan to provide advice and emotional support to fellow
counsellors, and clinical supervisors. Each counsellor was paired with a clinical supervi-
sor for guidance and they were experienced external psychotherapist trained at level 6.
The counsellors could seek guidance from the three, but the sharing of personal identifi-
able information was restricted to the supervisors and buddies.
Policies presented by Samaritan were reviewed for reliability and it was identified that
the Privacy policy contained inconsistencies on client and donor instructions which could
affect the counsellors provision of guidance. The findings were reported and accepted by
the stakeholders in the final validation meeting.
Using adaptations of DiCoT, the distribution of decision facilitating information for the
counsellor was modelled, highlighting authorised information flows, actors, resources,
and identified uncertainty (see Figure 8.3). A second model was also produced for the
supervisors as they shared information with additional entities such as the police. Table
8.5 presents a summary of the distributed rationalisation elements identified.
Based on the analysis, a requirement to highlight authorised sources and recipients of
information was identified. Resultant were policy statements contributing to Section - 3
of the policy, on information sourcing and sharing. See Appendix .2.2.
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Figure 8.3: Distribution of decision facilitating information
Element types Elements
Counsellor
Decision makers
Supervisor
Assigned buddy
Supervisor
Clinical supervisor
Manager
Police
Actors
Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub
Samaritan policies and guidelines
Resources
Professional body guidelines
Table 8.5: Distributed rationalisation elements summary
8.5.5 Goal facilitation
Application of the goal facilitation guideline aimed at identifying obstacles and conflicts
preventing the counsellors from handling client data securely.
As alluded to in Section 8.5.1, substantial obstacles or conflicts to secure data handling
decisions were not identified during the interviews or thematic analysis. The few that were
found were the negation of situations by the researcher while testing various possibilities
using BOW cases.
For example, it was inquired on what would happen if a buddy or supervisor were unavail-
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able to offer advice during uncertain situations. For the most part, the obstacle situations
were unlikely due to the fact that most data-related decisions at Samaritan were not time-
bound and could simply be resolved by waiting. Evidence in the exchange below.
Researcher: Assuming the supervisors were not around, what would you do?
Counsellor: I would telephone my clinical supervisor.
Researcher: What if the clinical supervisor is not picking up?
Counsellor: I would leave her a message.
Using KAOS and CAIRIS as a supporting tool, hypothetical obstacle and conflict situ-
ations were modelled to analyse situations like the exchange between the researcher
and counsellor above. A sample is illustrated in Figure 8.4. Substantial findings did not
emerge from the analysis, therefore policy requirements were not drawn from the goal
facilitation phase.
8.5.6 Requirements validation
The final design guideline for RBDM relates to requirements validation. In Section 7.3.6
it was stated that this involves identifying the effectiveness of the specified requirements.
Similarly, Action Research recommends an evaluation phase that includes determining
whether the theoretical effects of the action were realised. As the two achieve the same
purpose, the following evaluation section accounts for both.
8.6 Evaluation
This section is divided into two parts. The first part (Section 8.6.1), validates the in-
tervention to prove the effectiveness of the study approach; this includes validating the
policy and identifying contributions made to the charity. The second part (Section 8.6.2),
validates the study approach to prove the effectiveness of the guidelines.
8.6.1 Validation of intervention
This section validates the intervention to prove the effectiveness of the study approach.
8.6.1.1 Validation
A validation meeting was held for 2 hours on 24 July 2019 at Samaritan’s office with the
manager and one supervisor. Validation discussions were on the policy resulting from
the study and the persona. Though not initially agreed, the researcher felt the persona
would prove useful in explaining the policy design process. Both artefacts were emailed
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Figure 8.4: Benign obstacles
to Samaritan a day earlier.
Validation was ran as indicated in Section 8.4.4. For the most part, the stakeholders were
satisfied with the policy statements but made the following observations and corrections.
1: In the policy, the counsellors’ job title was corrected from psychotherapy counsellor
to counsellor, a psychotherapy counsellors is a specialised role with higher qualification
than those required by Samaritan. 2: Entities that facilitated the counsellors’ decision
making were not limited to the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy but
included similar professional bodies. 3: The supervisors’ distribution of client information
had to include the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) - which is the single point of
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contact for reporting safeguarding concerns. 4: Due to limited time and resources, the
manager observed that the policy statement where counsellors would commit to regular
refreshers on related security and privacy policies was difficult to achieve. The counsel-
lors had different levels of experience and worked on different days. This implied creating
a comprehensive training plan that would take the obstacles into account. The finding in-
dicated that although goal and conflict analysis (Section 8.5.5) did not yield results during
requirements elicitation and specification, it could prove useful during policy implementa-
tion.
8.6.1.2 Contributions
A central theme in Action research is the contribution of an intervention causing change
to the study environment (Baskerville 1999). The study accomplished this by presenting
a policy that considered the four problems discussed during Diagnosis (Section 8.3),
examples of each are highlighted as follows:
• Automation of processes
Critical assets to be secured and security procedures to be taken into account were
highlighted in the proposed policy in response to the charity’s need to automate
processes. In addition, the risk of a single point was identified as Samaritan kept its
operations and backup devices in a single location. The practice would cause risks
to automated services and avoidance measures were highlighted in the policy.
• Part-time counsellors knowledge
As a central reference point for secure data handling, the proposed policy high-
lights desired security practices and authorised sources and recipients of confiden-
tial information. This knowledge would prove useful for the security inexperienced
counsellors.
• IT staff experience
The policy is a central document highlighting secure data handling expectations at
the charity. It, therefore, aids the IT staff’s understanding thereby facilitating security
administration activities.
• GDPR concerns
The design and implementation of the policy is a step towards proving compliance
with principle six of GDPR which addresses data integrity and confidentiality.
In addition to the above, Samaritan’s manager expressed their interest in incorporating
the produced persona to their counsellor induction programme.
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8.6.2 Validation of approach
This section validates the study approach to prove the effectiveness of the guidelines.
8.6.2.1 Best Optimal and Worst cases
An early adoption to the Samaritan case study was the use of BOW cases to elicit the
counsellors’ risk decision making strategies. The approach was simple but it helped the
counsellors think outside their usual boundaries. For example, an interviewee pointed out
that a fire hazard was a worst-case scenario based on their knowledge that Samaritan’s
paper files and computers were kept in one office.
The benefit of using BOW cases was also evident when an interviewee said they didn’t
know who to contact in the event a client had a mental or emotional breakdown. While
the case initially seemed unrelated to data handling and security, it later became clear
that the unauthorised sharing of a client’s location would be a breach of confidentiality.
The finding prompted the need to define authorised information recipients in the secure
data handling policy.
Counsellor: ”I am thinking around client safety. If there were mental health issues and the
client was in a really really bad way and it was unsafe for them to leave, we would need a
contact. . . I think it would be useful in the contract, where the client said who to contact.
I don’t think we have that.”
8.6.2.2 Thematic analysis
While not a part of the guidelines, the use of thematically analysed data eased the design
process considerably by linking each guideline to appropriate data. The coding process
also helped the researcher’s familiarisation with the data and the visualisation of possible
risks and mitigation requirements. However, the use of thematic analysis is not a set part
of the guidelines as other analysis techniques such as Grounded Theory could equally
be used.
8.6.2.3 Design guidelines
Using the design guidelines to inform the study approach proved beneficial as they dic-
tated which areas the researcher would focus on at each stage of the study to elicit
appropriate requirements. This is evident in the output, where each guideline applied
contributed to a different section of the proposed policy.
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Implementing the guidelines as outlined in Table 8.2 also proved useful as output from
early phases fed to later phases. For examples, a data dissemination model designed
during Dynamic contextualisation (Section 8.5.3) later provided insight for Distributed ra-
tionalisation models (Section 8.5.4).
8.7 Specifying learning
The case study provides the following lessons.
8.7.1 Guideline applicability
By applying the guidelines, it was identified that while essential, not all guidelines may be
applicable in a study.
8.7.2 Eliciting risk decision strategies
The security knowledge eliciting problem was discussed earlier in Section 2.2.3.3. Similar
knowledge elicitation problems were identified in this study. Though decision-makers may
have an understanding of risk, their strategies for addressing it are sometimes second
nature and difficult to express making elicitation difficult. There still is a requirement for
improved knowledge elicitation techniques in security (Ollis 2019).
8.7.3 Modelling uncertainty through Distributed Cognition
Work in the case study illustrated that uncertainty can be modelled by adapting DiCoT,
a structured approach for analysing systems in terms of Distributed Cognition. The ap-
proach was introduced in Section 6.4.1.4 with the case study illustrating its application.
8.7.4 Tool support
The application of the guideline required several tools as indicated in Table 8.2. The
modest size of the study made the tools and models manageable, however, a lack of a
centralised tool managing the models could prove difficult in larger projects (Seffah and
Metzker 2004).
8.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, a case study was presented where the design guidelines for systems
deployed in cyber security RBDM were applied to devise a research approach used to
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inform the requirements of a secure data handling policy. In addition to the guidelines, a
key contribution was the presentation of an approach where uncertainty may be modelled
using Distributed Cognition.
While the main study participants were not security decision-makers, they proved rele-
vant for the validation work as the risky decisions analysed in the study were from the
security domain. Resulting from this is the secure data handling policy which facilitates
both the counsellors’ and IT/Security analysts’ decision making.
The study validated the guidelines as cumulative findings of the dissertation. This illus-
trates the adoption and adaptation of existing design and decision making techniques to
facilitate the specification of requirements for systems deployed in cyber security RBDM.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This chapter presents the significant findings from the dissertation. It evaluate the suc-
cess of the thesis in addressing the research question and the success of the contri-
butions in satisfying the research aims. The chapter then presents the challenges and
limitations experienced during the research and discusses future work. The chapter con-
cludes by re-emphasizing the relevance and value of the research contribution.
9.1 Key research findings
This section summarizes significant findings from the dissertation.
9.1.1 The nature of risk in cyber security
A central theme in this dissertation is the idea of risk in cyber security, how it is under-
stood and addressed. As part of the literature review, different views or understanding
of risk were identified. Based on this, the research has uncovered the nuances of risk in
cyber security.
For example, Chapter 4 analysed the proactive risk analysis activities deployed by se-
curity analysts. These are activities conducted before an incident has occurred dwelling
on identifying the likelihood of exploitation based on inherent system weaknesses. Re-
sults from the study motivated a second study, on reactive risk analysis focussing on
activities post-incident such as understanding the motivation for an attack. Based on
the understanding gained, the decision making difference between the two risk analysis
approaches were explained in Chapter 5. These were decision instantiated either by sit-
uation assessment or goal formation as a risk rationalisation strategy.
An alternative approach to considering risk in cyber security was the Relevance scope.
Studies in Chapter 4 indicated that there is a level of risk security decision-makers are
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willing to disregard before taking action. The Relevance scope was defined as a mini-
mum level (requirement) for the continued pursuit of a security goal. Comparisons were
drawn with the compliance budget, which states that the lengths at which one is willing to
comply with security depends on the perceived reward to the individual.
From Chapter 5 it was identified that risk in security is not limited to the possibility of
exploitation (explicit security risk), but may also result from decision making on potential
risk (meta-risk). Meta-risk is implicit and was categorized as the risk in understanding,
and the risk in response; both playing central roles in the direction of the research.
A few risk variations identified are illustrated in Table 9.1.
Term Variations
Risk Explicit (in domain) Implicit (in decision)
Risk Dynamic (from environmental) Static (from design)
Risk Objective (measurable) Perceived (feeling)
Risk outcome Negative Positive
Risk analysis Proactive Reactive
Meta-risk In understanding In response
Table 9.1: Risk variations
9.1.2 Independence of uncertainty
While uncertainty is an factor independent from risk, there is little clarity on how it should
be considered during design. The dissertation first considers this in Chapter 5 by cate-
gorising uncertainty causing factors as: environmental, contextual, personal, and infor-
mation quality. Having established this, Chapter 6, illustrated how these factors may be
used to model uncertainty where they were appended to distributed information models
as a way of expressing the level of confidence that may be placed in the information.
Uncertainty modelling is made possible because the proposed approach is to draw a
distinction between the likelihood of risk and the uncertainty of information which were
covered in the proposed guidelines 1 and 4 respectively (see Chapter 7). In other words,
information about risk and information for decision making need not be the same. The first
defines the problem, while the latter facilitates the decision, uncertainty was investigated
the latter.
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9.1.3 Distribution of decision making
The third area of note is the role Distributed Cognition plays in risk rationalisation and
decision making. The researcher’s initial understanding was that situation awareness
(Endsley 1995) was vital to decision making, however, findings indicate that Distributed
Cognition plays an equally important role. For example, the study in Chapter 4 indicated
that the analysts achieved their awareness through the distribution of information between
organisations, artefacts, and teams. The findings motivated the proposal of Principle 3 on
Distributed rationalisation covered in Chapters 6 and 7. The principle’s importance was
validated in Chapter 8, where its use aided identifying authorised sources and recipients
of security sensitive information for Samaritan’s secure data handling policy.
9.2 Evaluation
This section reviews how the research findings and contributions address the research
aims and overall research question.
9.2.1 Summarised findings from the research question
RBDM Design
Requirements
Tech-based decision 
facilitation
Securi
ty risk
s
Security
Decision-maker
Soft de
cision 
facilita
tion
Design 
Guidelines 
Facilitates
specifications
Tools and 
Techniques
Su
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ple
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tio
n
Decision risks
Problems
Figure 9.1: Thesis in context
In summary, this research is an implementation of inductive constructivism where each
finding informs the next step of the research.
The principal claim of the thesis is the presentation of complementary elements sup-
porting the specification of design requirements for systems deployed in cyber security
RBDM. While the design guidelines are a cumulation of the findings, we say the thesis
is a collection of complementary elements as each finding is a contribution in its own right.
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Figure 9.1 puts the thesis in context by highlighting the problems which are decision risks,
in security environments. The objective of the thesis was to therefore propose mitigation
approaches that would facilitate decision making, motivating the research question; What
system design techniques should be taken into consideration to facilitate cyber security
decision making during situations of risk and uncertainty?
The research question was addressed by dividing it into the three research aims detailed
in Sections 9.2.2, 9.2.3, and 9.2.4 below. In summary, the main contribution is the pro-
posal of design guidelines guiding the specification of requirements for systems deployed
in cyber security RBDM. Guidelines are proposed over design requirements as they are
independent of problem environments and are applicable to different scenarios, while
requirements are problem centric.
9.2.2 Aim 1
• To identify factors influencing risk analysis practices deployed by cyber security
risk-based decision makers.
The research aim was motivated by the lack of clear distinction on how security analysts
address risk and uncertainty. In most cases the literature detailed activities and decision
relating to risk in cyber security with uncertainty implied but not explicitly defined.
The aim was addressed in Chapter 4 where a study on proactive and reactive risk analy-
sis was conducted with security analysts. To this end, strategies for addressing risk were
identified which included awareness, communication, and individualistic attributes such
as experience and training. For most analysts, uncertainty was in the form of constraints
that restricted them from carry out their duties. It was established that the constraints
were the results of conditions where security and business goals were not contextually
analysed or understood during planning, resulting in goal conflicts.
Based on the findings, a focus on awareness to reduce risk, and a focus on the resolu-
tion of conflicts and obstacles to address uncertainty were identified as areas requiring
attention in subsequent investigations.
Contributions from the study were the identification of factors contributing to security an-
alysts’ risk practices and understanding.
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9.2.3 Aim 2
• To propose approaches for adapting cyber security decision making techniques to
design.
The research aim was motivated by the requirements to understand human cognition and
decision making research approaches with the aim of identifying how they could be used
to facilitate design.
Based on the literature, several approaches were reviewed and OODA was selected as a
baseline for adapting decision making strategies to design. This was based on its simple
and adaptable design which is in contrast to Situation Awareness (Endsley 1995), that
for example discusses spatial awareness which is not applicable outside the aviation do-
main. Adaptation work and analysis were conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5
focused on designing a normative model (RRP) based on OODA representing cyber se-
curity decision making, and in Chapter 6 the knowledge gained from the normative model
was used to design a conceptual model highlighting concepts and relationships required
to design for RBDM.
As a foundation model for a large part of the research RRP was validated in various ways,
however, the lack of access to cyber security participants in the UK motivated conducting
some validation studies in Japan. The conceptual model was validated using a scenario
based on an actual attack on the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Scenario played a central role in validation due to the limitations of knowledge elicitation
methods and the sensitivity of information in cyber security. A possible threat to validity
was that the scenarios could be limited by the researchers understanding. This was how-
ever avoided by first running the scenarios with available experts.
Contributions from the investigations are a normative model for communicating and trac-
ing risk rationalisation by cyber security decision-makers, and a conceptual model illus-
trating the various concepts and relationships in cyber security decision making .
To address research aim 2, the approach used to adapt cyber security decision making
to design is illustrated in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.2: Bridging decision making and design
9.2.4 Aim 3
• To propose approaches supporting the specification of design requirements for sys-
tems facilitating cyber security Risk-based Decision Making.
The research aim was motivated by the lack of evidence that traditional design ap-
proaches could support the elicitation of cognitive decision making requirements and
the shortfalls in cognitive approaches (CSE) when translating findings to design specifi-
cations.
The aim was addressed in Chapter 7 by building on insight gained from the conceptual
model proposed in Chapter 6. The conceptual model highlighted the concepts and rela-
tionships required for specifying design requirements for RBDM; which were then used
to draw design guidelines supported by representative modelling techniques.
As the guidelines are inductively constructed through research progression, the rationale
for their selection is justified by progressive validations at each stage of the research.
However, this is not to say alternative guidelines are not feasible as is the nature of qual-
itative research.
The guidelines were validated by informing an approach used to specify the requirements
for a secure data handling policy in Chapter 8.
Having implemented and validated the guidelines, the research has illustrated how to
effectively embed RBDM within cyber security system design, thereby addressing the re-
search question.
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9.2.5 Application of contributions
This section details the intended approach for disseminating and applying the contribu-
tions arising from the research, and it defines the target audience.
9.2.5.1 Application and target audience
The guidelines were developed to facilitate the capture of systems requirements for sys-
tems deployed in cyber security RBDM. The target audience are therefore system de-
signers and requirements engineers that focus on the human aspects of cyber security,
where risk-based decision-makers are the target system users. It is envisaged that the
requirements will be applied during the requirements elicitation and specification stages
of Requirements Engineering as illustrated in Chapter 8. Application of the guidelines is
however not limited to cyber security, a point highlighted in Section 7.2. In cyber security
the domain-risk is the security-risk (threat, vulnerability, and likelihood), however, the risk
may differ in other domains. The application of the guidelines in other domains (outside
cyber security) will be considered and evaluated as part of future work.
9.2.5.2 Accessibility
While the guidelines and other contribution in this dissertation would prove valuable when
designing for RBDM, their effectiveness may only be proven by their availability to the tar-
get audience. Illustrated in Section 1.5, contributions arising from thesis work have been
disseminated through peer-reviewed publications which have thus far including findings
from chapters 4, 5, and 6. Findings from the remaining two chapters will also be submit-
ted to peer-reviewed forums for publication.
As the research sponsor, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (dstl) also plans
to disseminate contributions arising from the thesis, where the researcher shall be invited
to present findings to officials in the defence sector. Collaboration opportunities shall be
explored on how findings may facilitate design for decision making in defence.
9.3 Challenges and limitations
Like other research undertakings, this work was not without its limitations and challenges.
A critical challenge was the low number of UK based security analysts willing to partic-
ipate in the research. As reported in chapters 4 and 5, the challenge was resolved by
working with analysts from outside the UK. While helpful, working with analysts from
outside the UK reduced the possibility for follow-up studies. For example, personas char-
acterizing analysts’ behaviour were designed based on the studies in Japan, however,
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validating the personas was not possible due to logistical issue, thus the personas were
not included in the dissertation.
A limitation resulting from researching in two different countries is the difference in culture.
As indicated by Hofstede et al. (2010) and referenced in Section 4.3.4, culture influences
the way decisions are made and culture is different from country to country. The research
findings are, therefore, only generalisable to a certain degree. For example, findings in
Section 4.3.4 suggests that the Japan based analysts’ preferred avoiding uncertainty and
making risky decisions. This may, however, not correspond to the analysts’ decision mak-
ing in the UK.
A second limitation of the research is that the participants were selected based on avail-
ability which could have affected who provided the data and what data they provided.
However, the fact that the data was collected from a cross-section of analysts from differ-
ent focus areas, different experience levels, and different industries provides a degree of
assurance that the data was not from a narrow sub-set.
A final limitation of the research is that the proposed guidelines have only been validated
by the researcher. As indicated in Section 9.2.5.2 above, this may be considered during
the collaboration work with dstl that aims to evaluate the applicability of the guidelines in
other domains.
9.4 Future work
This section proposes directions for future work based on findings from the dissertation.
Directions for future work mentioned in the sections above e.g., the applications of the
guidelines to other domains and the validation of the guidelines by third parties are not
repeated.
9.4.1 Design requirements for groups Risk-based Decision Making
To maintain a manageable scope, the approach taken by this research was to limit inves-
tigations to the understanding and approach taken by individual decision-makers when
addressing risk and uncertainty. The scope, therefore, leaves room for investigations
on RBDM requirements for group decision making. This also includes verifying if the
proposed guidelines may adequately facilitate the requirements specification process for
group RBDM.
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9.4.2 Consequences modelling
Based on the research, it has been identified that as a sector, cyber security tends to
focus on security risks caused by threats and that it pays less attention to the risks caused
by uninformed decision making (consequences). For examples, Chapter 4 illustrated the
consequences (conflicts) of misalignment between security and business goals. Future
work could investigate techniques for mapping security goals and business goals while
taking the decision-makers awarenesses and degree of freedom (the level of freedom or
authority to make a decision) into consideration.
9.5 Concluding summary
The research was motivated by the understanding the security analysts face the chal-
lenge of making decisions during situations of risk and uncertainty. While perfect deci-
sions are difficult to achieve during these conditions, an optimal decision could be attained
by considering the various factors that contribute to risk and uncertainty. The research
therefore investigated the decision activities of security analysts and proposed guidelines
that facilitate the elicitation and specifications of requirements for systems (soft and tech-
nical) deployed in cyber security, which in turn facilitate Risk-based Decision Making.
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.1 Risk Analysis Practices Data
Appendix .1 aims to give further detail on the interview processes, ethical considerations,
and data analysis methods used during the risk analysis practises studies covered in
Chapter 4.
The appendix begins by presenting predefined interview questions guiding the vulner-
ability analysis study in Appendix .1.1. A participant information sheet used to inform
participants on ethical consideration and the aim of the study, and a participant agree-
ment form used to obtain written consent are then presented in Appendix .1.2 and .1.3
respectively. These follow Bournemouth University’s ethics procedures for interviews and
focus groups. Two sample screenshots are then presented illustrating Grounded Theory
work during the proactive risk analysis study undertaken in Section 4.2, the first screen-
shot illustrates themes derived from the interview transcripts (Appendix .1.4), and the
second screenshot illustrates coding progression using NVivo (Appendix .1.5). Appendix
.1 concludes by presenting sample participant responses in Japanese from the reactive
analysis study covered in Section 4.3.
.1.1 Predefined interview questions
• What guidelines do you follow to help you manage risk?
• How do you select vulnerabilities to act upon when time and resources are limited?
• Are vulnerabilities identified as high or critical by the automated scanners represen-
tative of your work environment?
• How do you identify false positives?
• What were the occasions when you had to accepted risk?
• What kind of decision making constraints have you experienced during your work?
  
 
 
                              
The title of the research project 
 
Designing for Cyber Security Risk-based Decision Making 
 
Invitation to take part 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take the time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not 
you wish to take part. 
 
Researcher 
This study is being carried out by Andrew M’manga a PhD researcher at Bournemouth University 
under the faculty of Science and Technology. The research is in Cyber Security with a focus on 
designing systems for decision making during risk and uncertainty. 
 
Research Funders  
This research is funded collaboratively by Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and 
Bournemouth University. 
 
Purpose of the project 
Cyber security is an area that has been given a lot of attention in recent years due to the current 
state of information security. This project has been undertaken with the understanding that it is 
better to consider security and usability issues early during the design stages as opposed to 
implementing them as an afterthought.  Security professional regularly face the challenge of 
identifying the most effective response when faced with risk under uncertain conditions. The project 
aims to facilitate the decision making process by proposing techniques for incorporating risk-based 
decision making requirements during design.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
 
Participants for this research have been chosen based on the reason that they are cybersecurity 
professionals or play a role essential to understanding decision making during risk and uncertainty in 
their organisation. Recruitment is based on management recommendation from your organisation, 
and participants will most likely not exceed ten.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a participant agreement form.  You can withdraw 
during the interview at any time and without giving a reason and we will remove any data collected 
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.1.2 Participant Information Sheet
  
 
 
about you from the study.  Once the interview has finished you can still withdraw your data up to the 
point where the data has been analysed and has become anonymous, so your identity cannot be 
determined.  Deciding to take part or not will not adversely impact affect you or others in any way.  
 
What would taking part involve?  
 
The interviews will involve a series of unstructured questions aimed at eliciting requirements that 
could facilitate your decision making during risk and uncertainty. The facilitation will take the form of 
jointly developing policies or tools that take risk-based decision making into account. Interviews 
could be on a one-to-one or group discussion (focus group) basis and should last for roughly an hour, 
to two for focus groups.  
Using a hand-held audio recording device, audio recordings of the interviews shall be taken purely 
for the purpose of transcribing the data for qualitative analysis and all personal identification 
information (if any) shall be anonymised. As the interviews shall be unstructured, the direction the 
interview questions take shall be based on participant’s responses. All interviews shall be held within 
the participant’s organisations or by Skype where need be.  
 
What are the advantages and possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
Based on the participating organisation's requirements, it is hoped that tools, policies or procedures 
that take risk-based decision making into account shall be developed or improvements shall be made 
to current practices. There are no foreseeable risks or discomfort expected as a result of 
participating, and all interviews shall be held during normal working hours.  
 
What type of information will be sought from me and why is the collection of this 
information relevant for achieving the research project’s objectives? 
 
The research will only aim at collecting data to understand decisions making during risk and 
uncertainty and from an information security perspective. The information collected will depend on 
the tools, policies or procedures your organisation wishes to develop. However, no personal 
identifiable data or confidential information will be required of you. Questions will relate to; 
understanding the nature of risk and uncertainty in the organisation, identifying information sources 
for decision making, goals, obstacles, and key decision making roles. 
 
Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used? 
 
As mentioned above, audio recordings of the interviews will be made during this research and will be 
used only for analysis and for illustration at conference presentations and lectures. No other use will 
be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed 
access to the recordings. 
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How will my information be kept? 
 
 All the information we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly in 
accordance with current Data Protection Regulations.  You will not be able to be identified in any 
reports or publications without your specific consent. 
 
All personal identification data relating to this study (e.g. organisation and participant names) will be 
held only up to the date of publication of the research. Bournemouth University will hold the 
information we collect on a protected secure network. 
 
Except where it has been anonymised, we will restrict access to your personal data to those 
individuals who have a legitimate reason to access it for the purpose or purposes for which it is held 
by us.  As well as BU staff and the BU student working on the research project and the project 
funders who will be given access to it in anonymised form. 
 
The information collected about you may be used in an anonymous form to support other research 
projects in the future and access to it in this form will not be restricted.  It will not be possible for you 
to be identified from this data.  Anonymised data will be added to Bournemouth Universities’ Data 
Repository (a central location where data is stored) and which will be publicly available. 
 
 
Contact for further information  
 
If you have any questions or would like further information, please contact Dr Shamal Faily and Dr 
John McAlaney. 
 
Bournemouth University 
Poole House, 
Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, 
Poole, Dorset BH12 5BB, 
Tel +44 (0) 1202 965078 
 
Any concerns about the study should be directed to sfaily@bournemouth.ac.uk.  If your concerns 
have not been answered within two weeks, you should contact Professor Marcin Budka, Faculty of 
Science and Technology, Bournemouth University by email to 
researchgovernance@bournemouth.ac.uk.  
 
 
Finally 
 
If you decide to take part, you will be given a copy of the information sheet and a participant 
agreement form to sign and keep. 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research project. 
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Full title of project: Designing for Cyber Security Risk-based Decision 
Making 
Name, position and contact details of researcher: Andrew M’manga, PhD Researcher, Bournemouth University. 
Fern Barrow, Poole BH12 5BB. ammanga@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Name, position and contact details of supervisor: Dr Shamal Faily, Senior Lecturer (Sci-Tech), PhD Researcher, 
Bournemouth University. Fern Barrow, Poole BH12 5BB. sfaily@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Please tick the appropriate boxes Yes No 
Taking Part:   
I have read and understood the Project Participant Information Sheet  ☐ ☐ 
I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. ☐ ☐ 
I understand that my participation is voluntary. ☐ ☐ 
I understand that I am free to withdraw up to the point where the data are processed and become 
anonymous, so my identity cannot be.  
☐ ☐ 
Should I not wish to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline.  ☐ ☐ 
I understand that the interview will be digitally recorded (audio) and then transcribed. ☐ ☐ 
I agree to take part in the project.   ☐ ☐ 
Use of the information I provide for this project only:   
I understand my personal details such as name and organisation will not be revealed to people 
outside this project. 
☐ ☐ 
I understand that my words may be quoted anonymously in publications, reports, web pages and 
other research outputs. 
☐ 
 
☐ 
I understand that I will not be identified from quotations in publications. ☐ ☐ 
Use of the information I provide beyond this project:   
I understand that the anonymised transcript from the interview will be deposited in Bournemouth 
University’s Online Research Data Repository. 
☐ ☐ 
I understand that the anonymised information given in this interview may be used by the research 
team to support other research projects in the future, including future publications, reports or 
presentations 
☐ ☐ 
 
____________________________      _______________      __________________________________ 
Name of Participant                                Date                              Signature 
____________________________      _______________      __________________________________ 
Name of Researcher                               Date                              Signature 
This form should be signed and dated by all parties after the participant receives a copy of the participant information sheet and any other 
written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated participant agreement form should be kept with the project’s 
main documents which must be kept in a secure location.   
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.1.4 NVivo - Interview to theme relationships
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.1.5 NVivo - Grounded Theory coding
150.1.6 Sample participant responses in Japanese/Katakana
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.2 Case study Data
Appendix .2 presents further information on findings from the case study conducted in
Chapter 8.
The appendix first present a full description of the persona Mary Hughes in Appendix
.2.1, who represents an archetypical counsellor used for eliciting the secure data han-
dling policy’s requirements in the study. Appendix .2.2 is the secure data handling policy
designed by implementing the RBDM design guidelines.
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.2.1 Case study - Persona
Mary Hughes - Counsellor 1
Activities
Mary is a volunteer at a local charity offering counselling services to traumatised parents.
Her role with the charity includes assessing referral, offering the clients emotional and
practical support, keeping track of the client’s progression and maintaining client files.
Skills
Mary trained as a counsellor and has a level 4 Diploma in counselling and psychother-
apy. She is also a member of the British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy
(BACP) where she receives additional guidance. Listening to her clients’ cases and tak-
ing notes have helped improve her skills in these areas.
Attitudes
Mary believes her job requires an open, empathetic, and non-judgemental approach to
gaining the client’s trust. Having no preconceived assumptions on the clients’ situation is
important and this is greatly aided by keeping a distance from the clients’ social media
accounts.
Mary is aware that her line of work requires strict adherence to rules and confidentiality.
To unwind from stressful client sessions, she confides in a buddy assigned by the charity
or her clinical supervisor.
From a personal perspective, Mary understands the importance of self-care and continu-
ous professional development.
Aptitudes
Mary has the ability to listen attentively and provide guidance. She understands that her
clients are vulnerable and require patience.
Motivations
Due to the nature of the work, distressful and shocking stories from the clients are un-
1Photo by Charisse Kenion on Unsplash
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fortunately all too common; however, Mary is motivated by the clients improving mental
state and the impact it has on their family life.
.2.2 Case study - Policy
Secure Client Data Handling Policy
The aim of this policy is to secure client data by focusing on possible decision and actions
that could be made relating to the access, storage processing, and dissemination of client
data.
To this effect, client data is considered with regards but not limited to the following security
risks:
• Confidentiality
• Availability
• Integrity
1. Assets
Assets are artefacts belonging to Samaritans that hold client data and must be treated in
a secure manner. Assets are, but not limited to:
• Paper-based (hard copy) forms and files
• Mobiles phones
• Computers
• Filing cabinets
• Digital storage devices
2. Counsellors
To ensure the secure handling of clients’ data and confidential provision of counselling
services:
• The councillors shall be a permanent employee or contracted volunteer at Samari-
tans.
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• Permanent counsellors shall have a minimum of a level 4 Diploma in counselling
and psychotherapy, while trainees shall at a minimum be in the final year towards
achieving the level four Diploma in counselling and psychotherapy.
• Counsellors shall be registered with the British Association for Counselling and Psy-
chotherapy (BACP) or similar professional bodies.
• Samaritans shall have Level 6 qualified clinical supervisors assigned to permanent
councillors, or expect Colleges to assign supervisors to volunteering trainees (see
Counselling policy).
• Counsellors shall read, sign, and have knowledge of related security and privacy
policies and guidelines.
• Counsellors shall commit to regular refreshers on related security and privacy poli-
cies and guidelines.
• Counsellors shall have up to date DBS checks and have their own insurance from
a reputable insurance provider.
3. Information sourcing and sharing
During your time with Samaritans, there may be situations where you may be required
to seek or share information in order to make informed decisions on clients and their
data. Information may only be sourced from, or shared with the following - authorised by
Samaritans:
• Samaritans policies and guidelines
These include, but not limited to the Counselling, Confidentiality, Privacy, Lone
working, and Safeguarding policies and guidelines.
• Assigned clinical supervisor
Information passed to the clinical supervisor shall be of a non-personal identifiable
form.
• Assigned buddy
Buddies are assigned and are not based on colleague availability.
• The Manager
Information passed to the manager shall be kept confidential between the man-
ager and the counsellor unless otherwise stated in relevant Samaritan policies or
procedures.
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• The Police
Information shall be shared with Police in accordance with safeguarding proce-
dures.
• The Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH)
Information shall be shared with MASH in accordance with safeguarding proce-
dures.
• Relevant authorities
Information shall be shared with relevant authorities such as a General practitioner
(GP) in accordance with safeguarding procedures.
Sourcing and sharing information from, or with any other source such as social media is
strictly prohibited. All actions and decisions shall be based on facts as presented by the
client unless there is a clear or probable violation of the law.
4. Accessing and Storing Data
To ensure the secure storage and restricted access to client data, counsellors shall:
• Store paper-based files and folders in locked cabinets
• Lock filing cabinets
• Lock doors when offices are not in use
• Place phones in secure areas
• Password-protect computers
• Delete client messages in phones on a regular basis
• Destroy dated data as stipulated by guidelines in the privacy policy
• Maintain a clean desk policy
5. Data Availability
To ensure the continuous availability of client data enabling the fulfilment of the charity’s
services, counsellors shall:
• Conduct regular data backups
• Store backup devices in secure alternative locations
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6. Disseminating Data
To preserve client confidentiality:
• Client data shall be disseminated to authorised parties and in a non-personal iden-
tifiable manner unless otherwise stated by relevant policies and guidelines.
